Chatcrystal MCP Server
chatcrystal
npm
v0.6.0
Source verified
Published by zengliangyi — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Local-first AI PKM for coding conversations — supports Claude Code, Cursor, Codex CLI, Trae, GitHub Copilot
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server/src/cli/client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server/src/cli/client.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { resolve } from 'node:path'; import { writeFileSync, readFileSync, exist
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server/src/cli/client.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server/src/cli/commands/serve.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server/src/cli/commands/serve.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { resolve } from 'node:path'; import { writeFileSync, openSync, mkdirSync
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server/src/cli/commands/serve.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server/src/cli/processes.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server/src/cli/processes.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs'; import { promisify } from 'n
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server/src/cli/processes.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server/src/services/memory/projectKey.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server/src/services/memory/projectKey.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; import fs from 'node:fs'; import path
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server/src/services/memory/projectKey.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server/src/services/memory/quality.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server/src/services/memory/quality.js:1345`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ssLifecycleObject = /\b(child_process|child process|daemon pid|pid|crystal serve -d|crystal status|spawn handshake|spawn
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server/src/services/memory/quality.js
Tools 7
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_noteno sensitive capabilityget_relationsno sensitive capabilitylist_notesno sensitive capabilityrecall_for_taskno sensitive capabilitysearch_knowledgeno sensitive capabilityvalidate_task_memoryno sensitive capabilitywrite_task_memoryno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (7 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.5.9 |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v0.5.8 |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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