Cerevox — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "cerevox-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "cerevox-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "cerevox-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source",
"file-write"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([hippo_list_files]) and tools that can send data out ([hippo_upload_file_url]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "hippo_list_files → hippo_upload_file_url"
},
"evidence": "sources [hippo_list_files] → sinks [hippo_upload_file_url]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"hippo_list_files"
],
"sinks": [
"hippo_upload_file_url"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"file_url\" on \"hippo_upload_file_url\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"hippo_upload_file_url\" takes a URL/host parameter \"file_url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "hippo_upload_file_url",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file_url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "file_url"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"hippo_delete_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"hippo_delete_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "hippo_delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"hippo_delete_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"hippo_delete_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "hippo_delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file_id\" on \"hippo_delete_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"hippo_delete_file\" takes a path parameter \"file_id\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "hippo_delete_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file_id"
},
"data": {
"param": "file_id"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"hippo_list_files"
],
"externalSink": [
"hippo_upload_file_url"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"hippo_list_files",
"hippo_upload_file_url"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: hippo_list_files → hippo_upload_file_url."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "lexa_parse_document",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lexa_get_job_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hippo_create_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hippo_list_folders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hippo_get_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hippo_delete_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hippo_upload_file_url",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"upload_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "hippo_list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "hippo_get_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hippo_delete_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "hippo_create_chat",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hippo_list_chats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hippo_ask_question",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hippo_get_chat_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hippo_get_question_details",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hippo_delete_chat",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "account_get_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "account_get_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "account_get_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "account_list_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "account_get_current_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "4ae05d10ee747c3a5ff6bf918400b63098b00bb7d2ee09f259a8ccb95bfbb0ce",
"stats": {
"tools": 21,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 2,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}