Celavii M365 — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "celavii-m365",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "celavii-m365"
},
"server": {
"name": "celavii-m365"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (36 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: m365_onedrive_download → m365_onedrive_list → m365_draft_email. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "m365_onedrive_download → m365_onedrive_list → m365_draft_email"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"m365_read_email",
"m365_onedrive_download"
],
"sources": [
"m365_onedrive_list"
],
"sinks": [
"m365_send_email",
"m365_draft_email"
],
"path": [
"m365_onedrive_download",
"m365_onedrive_list",
"m365_draft_email"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "m365_onedrive_download",
"to": "m365_onedrive_list",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "m365_onedrive_list",
"to": "m365_draft_email",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/auth-server.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/auth-server.js:88`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/auth-server.js"
},
"evidence": "; const res = await fetch( `https://login.microsoftonline.com/${this.config.tenantId}/oauth2/v2.0/token`,",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/auth-server.js",
"line": 88,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:298`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "; const res = await fetch( `https://login.microsoftonline.com/${this.config.tenantId}/oauth2/v2.0/token`,",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 298,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/remote/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/remote/index.js:296`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/remote/index.js"
},
"evidence": "; const res = await fetch( `https://login.microsoftonline.com/${this.config.tenantId}/oauth2/v2.0/token`,",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/remote/index.js",
"line": 296,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"m365_read_email",
"m365_onedrive_download"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"m365_onedrive_list"
],
"externalSink": [
"m365_send_email",
"m365_draft_email"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"m365_onedrive_download",
"m365_onedrive_list",
"m365_draft_email"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: m365_onedrive_download → m365_onedrive_list → m365_draft_email."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "m365_authenticate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_check_auth_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_logout",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_about",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_list_emails",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_search_emails",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_read_email",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "m365_send_email",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "m365_send_draft",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_draft_email",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "m365_mark_as_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_list_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_create_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_accept_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_decline_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_cancel_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_delete_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_list_folders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_create_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_move_emails",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_onedrive_list",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "m365_onedrive_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_onedrive_download",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "m365_onedrive_upload",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_onedrive_share",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_onedrive_create_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_onedrive_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_list_rules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_create_rule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_update_rule_sequence",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_delete_rule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_flow_list_environments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_flow_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_flow_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_flow_list_runs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "m365_flow_toggle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "a5255d455f8f4ff4c33932428b5edacff20510304faaeeea4e86465102a122dc",
"stats": {
"tools": 36,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 0,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}