Cccmemory MCP Server
cccmemory
npm
v2.1.0
Published by xiaolai — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.
Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
| −11 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×3 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.
Findings 8
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/storage/SQLiteManager.d.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/storage/SQLiteManager.d.ts:62`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/storage/SQLiteManager.d.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/storage/SQLiteManager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/storage/SQLiteManager.js:375`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/storage/SQLiteManager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/McpConfig.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/McpConfig.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/McpConfig.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/worktree.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/worktree.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/worktree.js
high Package runs install-time scripts (preinstall, postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"cccmemory" executes preinstall/postinstall script(s) at install time. The large majority of malicious packages abuse install hooks to run code before you ever import them.
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package cccmemory
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/embeddings/VectorStore.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/embeddings/VectorStore.js:606`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec(`
CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE IF NOT EXISTS vec_chunk_embeddings
USING vec0(
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
embedding float[${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/embeddings/VectorStore.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/storage/SQLiteManager.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/storage/SQLiteManager.js:267`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec(`
CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE IF NOT EXISTS vec_message_embeddings
USING vec0(
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
embedding float[${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/storage/SQLiteManager.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/utils/ProjectMigration.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/ProjectMigration.js:282`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec(`VACUUM INTO '${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/ProjectMigration.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.1.0 latest |
C 74/100 | 8 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
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Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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