C64bridge MCP Server
c64bridge
npm
v1.0.2
Source verified
Published by chrisgleissner — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
C64 Bridge MCP server for Commodore 64 Ultimate hardware and VICE emulator control
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 14
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/rag/externalFetcher.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/rag/externalFetcher.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/rag/externalFetcher.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/sidplayRunner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/sidplayRunner.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs"; import path from "node:path"; export class SidplayExec
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sidplayRunner.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/vice/process.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/vice/process.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs"; import net from "node:net"; import { createOutputTailC
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/vice/process.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/viceRunner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/viceRunner.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs"; import path from "node:path"; export class ViceExecuti
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/viceRunner.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/audio/record_and_analyze_audio.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/audio/record_and_analyze_audio.js:15`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: portAudio = await import(naModule); } catch (e) { throw new Error("Audio backend not available. Pl
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/audio/record_and_analyze_audio.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/check-node-compat.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/check-node-compat.mjs:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; const repoRoot = path.resolve(path.di
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/check-node-compat.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/check-package.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/check-package.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { promises as fs } from 'node:fs'; import path from 'node:path'; const r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/check-package.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/generate-changelog.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/generate-changelog.mjs:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFile, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'; import { existsSync } fr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/generate-changelog.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/invoke-bun.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/invoke-bun.mjs:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; function resolveBunExecutable() { c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/invoke-bun.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/prepare-release.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/prepare-release.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { access, readFile, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'; import path from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/prepare-release.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/run-coverage.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/run-coverage.mjs:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; const __filename = fileURLToPath(impo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/run-coverage.mjs
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/cli.js)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/cli.js:60`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: le://${entry}`); await import(entryUrl.href); }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/cli.js
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/mockC64Server.mjs)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/mockC64Server.mjs:12`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ChargenGlyphs } = await import(chargenModuleUrl.href); function parseNumeric(value, defaultRadix = 16) { if (!value)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/mockC64Server.mjs
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/start-mock-c64.mjs)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/start-mock-c64.mjs:21`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: MockC64Server } = await import(moduleUrl.href); const server = await startMockC64Server(); const baseUrl = server.ba
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/start-mock-c64.mjs
Tools 1
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
Active Platform Statusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (1 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.2 latest |
A 94/100 | 14 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.0.1 |
A 94/100 | 14 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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