Byterover Cli MCP Server
byterover-cli
npm
v3.16.1
Published by campfirein — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
ByteRover's CLI
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/agent/infra/file-system/file-system-service.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/infra/file-system/file-system-service.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'node:fs/promises'; import { EOL } from 'node:os'; import path fr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/agent/infra/file-system/file-system-service.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/agent/infra/swarm/adapters/gbrain-adapter.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/infra/swarm/adapters/gbrain-adapter.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'node:fs'; import { join } from 'node:path'; /** * D
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/agent/infra/swarm/adapters/gbrain-adapter.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/agent/infra/swarm/validation/config-validator.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/agent/infra/swarm/validation/config-validator.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'node:fs'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/agent/infra/swarm/validation/config-validator.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/oclif/hooks/init/block-command-update-npm.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/oclif/hooks/init/block-command-update-npm.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { isNpmGlobalInstall } from './update-notifier.js'; export function handl
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/oclif/hooks/init/block-command-update-npm.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/oclif/hooks/postrun/after-update.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/oclif/hooks/postrun/after-update.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { readdir, readlink, rm, stat } from 'node:fs/promises'; import { basenam
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/oclif/hooks/postrun/after-update.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server/infra/daemon/brv-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server/infra/daemon/brv-server.js:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { fork } from 'node:child_process'; import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'; import { mkdirSync, readdirSync, readF
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server/infra/daemon/brv-server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tui/components/onboarding/copyable-prompt.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tui/components/onboarding/copyable-prompt.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { platform } from 'node:os'; import { useCallback, useEffect, useState }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tui/components/onboarding/copyable-prompt.js
Tools 2
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
brv-curateno sensitive capabilitybrv-queryno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (2 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.16.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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