Bridge — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "bridge-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "bridge-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "bridge-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 89,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input",
"file-write",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (82 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: fetch → create_directory → move_file. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "fetch → create_directory → move_file"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"fetch"
],
"sources": [
"file_list",
"get-env",
"read_file",
"read_text_file",
"read_media_file",
"write_file",
"edit_file",
"create_directory",
"list_directory",
"list_directory_with_sizes",
"directory_tree",
"search_files",
"get_file_info"
],
"sinks": [
"register_agent",
"run_powershell",
"move_file"
],
"path": [
"fetch",
"create_directory",
"move_file"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "fetch",
"to": "create_directory",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "create_directory",
"to": "move_file",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"register_agent\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"register_agent\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"execute command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "register_agent"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"run_powershell\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"run_powershell\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"powershell\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "run_powershell"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (local_agent.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`local_agent.py:267`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "local_agent.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "local_agent.py",
"line": 267
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (local_agent_tools/app_tools.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`local_agent_tools/app_tools.py:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "local_agent_tools/app_tools.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.Popen(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "local_agent_tools/app_tools.py",
"line": 51
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (local_agent_tools/system_tools.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`local_agent_tools/system_tools.py:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "local_agent_tools/system_tools.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "local_agent_tools/system_tools.py",
"line": 10
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/auto_auth.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`scripts/auto_auth.py:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/auto_auth.py"
},
"evidence": "os.system(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/auto_auth.py",
"line": 9
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/open_github.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`scripts/open_github.py:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/open_github.py"
},
"evidence": "os.system(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/open_github.py",
"line": 10
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (servers/scripts/release.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`servers/scripts/release.py:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "servers/scripts/release.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "servers/scripts/release.py",
"line": 42
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (servers/src/filesystem/__tests__/structured-content.test.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`servers/src/filesystem/__tests__/structured-content.test.ts:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "servers/src/filesystem/__tests__/structured-content.test.ts"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "servers/src/filesystem/__tests__/structured-content.test.ts",
"line": 7
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (utils/updater.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`utils/updater.py:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "utils/updater.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "utils/updater.py",
"line": 9
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"write_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"write_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"write_file\"). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "write_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"edit_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"edit_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"edit_file\"). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "edit_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"move_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"move_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"move_file\"). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "move_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write",
"external-sink"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"register_agent\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"register_agent\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "register_agent"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"run_powershell\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"run_powershell\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "run_powershell"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"write_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"write_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "write_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"edit_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"edit_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "edit_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"move_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"move_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "move_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write",
"external-sink"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"read_text_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"read_text_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "read_text_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"read_media_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"read_media_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "read_media_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"write_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"write_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "write_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"edit_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"edit_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "edit_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"create_directory\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"create_directory\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_directory",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"list_directory\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"list_directory\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "list_directory",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"list_directory_with_sizes\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"list_directory_with_sizes\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "list_directory_with_sizes",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"directory_tree\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"directory_tree\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "directory_tree",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"search_files\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"search_files\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "search_files",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"get_file_info\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"get_file_info\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "get_file_info",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"bridge-mcp\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "bridge-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"fetch"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"file_list",
"get-env",
"read_file",
"read_text_file",
"read_media_file",
"write_file",
"edit_file",
"create_directory",
"list_directory",
"list_directory_with_sizes",
"directory_tree",
"search_files",
"get_file_info"
],
"externalSink": [
"register_agent",
"run_powershell",
"move_file"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"fetch",
"create_directory",
"move_file"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: fetch → create_directory → move_file."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "register_agent",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"execute command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "unregister_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_agent_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_default_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "click",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "double_click",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "right_click",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "type_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "press_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hotkey",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scroll",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "move_mouse",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drag",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_desktop_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_screen_size",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_mouse_position",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_visual_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "click_grid",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "app_launch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "app_switch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "app_close",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "app_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_powershell",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"powershell\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "run_cmd",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "file_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "file_write",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "file_list",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "clipboard_copy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clipboard_paste",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_navigate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_click",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_type",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_press",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chrome_open",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chrome_navigate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wait",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_setup_instructions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "echo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-annotated-message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-env",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_env\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get-resource-links",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-resource-reference",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-roots-list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-structured-content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-sum",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-tiny-image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gzip-file-as-resource",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "toggle-simulated-logging",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "toggle-subscriber-updates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trigger-elicitation-request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trigger-long-running-operation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trigger-sampling-request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fetch",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "read_text_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "read_media_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "read_multiple_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "write_file",
"tags": [
"file-write",
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"write_file\""
],
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "edit_file",
"tags": [
"file-write",
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"edit_file\""
],
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "create_directory",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_directory",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_directory_with_sizes",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "directory_tree",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "move_file",
"tags": [
"file-write",
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"move_file\""
],
"external-sink": [
"parameter \"destination\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "search_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_info",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_allowed_directories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_entities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_relations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_observations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_entities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_observations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_relations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_nodes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "open_nodes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "sequentialthinking",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "b860124ce44af865fc3c52285a08fbb1c86f9f5984ecf4b162233eda471325ff",
"stats": {
"tools": 82,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 10,
"medium": 3,
"low": 15,
"info": 1
}
}
}