Bridge (BarhamAgha1) MCP Server
bridge-mcp
PyPI
v2.1.0
Published by barhamagha1 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Visual Desktop Bridge - Give any AI full control over Windows
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 19
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: fetch → file_list → run_powershell. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow fetch → file_list → run_powershell
high Tool "run_powershell" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_powershell" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "powershell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_powershell
high Shell/command execution in server code (local_agent.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`local_agent.py:267`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: mmand.""" result = subprocess.run( ["powershell", "-Command", command], capture_output=True, text
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server local_agent.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (local_agent_tools/app_tools.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`local_agent_tools/app_tools.py:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: lower(), name) subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True) return f"Launched {name}" except Exception as e:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server local_agent_tools/app_tools.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (local_agent_tools/system_tools.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`local_agent_tools/system_tools.py:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecute result = subprocess.run( ["powershell", "-Command", command], capture_output=T
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server local_agent_tools/system_tools.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (utils/updater.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`utils/updater.py:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["git"] + args, capture_output=True, text
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server utils/updater.py
medium Tool "write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool write_file
medium Tool "edit_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "edit_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "edit_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool edit_file
medium Tool "move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool move_file
low Mutating tool "run_powershell" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_powershell" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_powershell
low Mutating tool "write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool write_file
low Mutating tool "edit_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "edit_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool edit_file
low Mutating tool "move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool move_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "write_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "write_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool write_file · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "edit_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "edit_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool edit_file · inputSchema.properties.path
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/auto_auth.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/auto_auth.py:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t(f"Opening {url}...") os.system(f'start chrome "{url}"') print("Waiting for page load...") time.sleep(5) print
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/auto_auth.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/open_github.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/open_github.py:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (User's daily chrome) os.system(f'start chrome "{url}"') # Wait for load time.sleep(3) # Take initial screensho
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/open_github.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (servers/scripts/release.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`servers/scripts/release.py:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ts in repo subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "--verify", value], check=True, capture_ou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server servers/scripts/release.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (servers/src/filesystem/__tests__/structured-content.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`servers/src/filesystem/__tests__/structured-content.test.ts:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; /** * Integration tests to verify that tool handlers return structuredConte
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server servers/src/filesystem/__tests__/structured-content.test.ts
Tools 82
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
edit_filewrites filesfetchingests untrusted inputfile_listreads sensitive dataget-envreads sensitive datamove_filewrites filesread_filereads sensitive datarun_powershellruns code / shellwrite_filewrites filesadd_observationsno sensitive capabilityapp_closeno sensitive capability
Show 72 more tools ↓
app_launchno sensitive capabilityapp_listno sensitive capabilityapp_switchno sensitive capabilitybrowser_clickno sensitive capabilitybrowser_contentno sensitive capabilitybrowser_navigateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_pressno sensitive capabilitybrowser_screenshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_typeno sensitive capabilitycheck_agent_healthno sensitive capabilitychrome_navigateno sensitive capabilitychrome_openno sensitive capabilityclickno sensitive capabilityclick_gridno sensitive capabilityclipboard_copyno sensitive capabilityclipboard_pasteno sensitive capabilitycreate_directoryno sensitive capabilitycreate_entitiesno sensitive capabilitycreate_relationsno sensitive capabilitydelete_entitiesno sensitive capabilitydelete_observationsno sensitive capabilitydelete_relationsno sensitive capabilitydirectory_treeno sensitive capabilitydouble_clickno sensitive capabilitydragno sensitive capabilityechono sensitive capabilityfile_readno sensitive capabilityfile_writeno sensitive capabilityget_desktop_stateno sensitive capabilityget_file_infono sensitive capabilityget_infono sensitive capabilityget_mouse_positionno sensitive capabilityget_screen_sizeno sensitive capabilityget_setup_instructionsno sensitive capabilityget_visual_stateno sensitive capabilityget-annotated-messageno sensitive capabilityget-resource-linksno sensitive capabilityget-resource-referenceno sensitive capabilityget-roots-listno sensitive capabilityget-structured-contentno sensitive capabilityget-sumno sensitive capabilityget-tiny-imageno sensitive capabilitygzip-file-as-resourceno sensitive capabilityhotkeyno sensitive capabilitylist_agentsno sensitive capabilitylist_allowed_directoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_directoryno sensitive capabilitylist_directory_with_sizesno sensitive capabilitymove_mouseno sensitive capabilityopen_nodesno sensitive capabilitypress_keyno sensitive capabilityread_graphno sensitive capabilityread_media_fileno sensitive capabilityread_multiple_filesno sensitive capabilityread_text_fileno sensitive capabilityregister_agentno sensitive capabilityright_clickno sensitive capabilityrun_cmdno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityscrollno sensitive capabilitysearch_filesno sensitive capabilitysearch_nodesno sensitive capabilitysequentialthinkingno sensitive capabilityset_default_agentno sensitive capabilitytoggle-simulated-loggingno sensitive capabilitytoggle-subscriber-updatesno sensitive capabilitytrigger-elicitation-requestno sensitive capabilitytrigger-long-running-operationno sensitive capabilitytrigger-sampling-requestno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capabilityunregister_agentno sensitive capabilitywaitno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (82 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.1.0 latest |
B 89/100 | 19 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan bridge-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Bridge 10
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 11 side by side →
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