Brain — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "brain-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "brain-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "brain-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"file-write",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (embedding-worker.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`embedding-worker.mjs:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "embedding-worker.mjs"
},
"evidence": "{ execFileSync } from \"child_process\"; import { existsSync } from \"fs\"; const BATCH_SIZE = 10; const POLL_INTERVAL = 5",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "embedding-worker.mjs",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (encryption.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`encryption.mjs:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "encryption.mjs"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from 'node:child_process'; const KEYCHAIN_SERVICE = 'claude-brain-vault'; const KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT = 'defaul",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "encryption.mjs",
"line": 15,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (coordinator.mjs)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`coordinator.mjs:164`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "coordinator.mjs"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(\"https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages\", { method: \"POST\", headers: {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "coordinator.mjs",
"line": 164,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (encryption.mjs)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`encryption.mjs:54`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "encryption.mjs"
},
"evidence": "ry { const result = execSync( `security find-generic-password -s \"${KEYCHAIN_SERVICE}\" -a \"${KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT}",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "encryption.mjs",
"line": 54,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"brain_unlink\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"brain_unlink\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"unlink\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "brain_unlink"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"brain_unlink\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"brain_unlink\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "brain_unlink"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "brain_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_sync_candidates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_mark_synced",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_export",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_timetravel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_propose_from_transcript",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_create_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_spaced_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_sync_push",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_sync_pull",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_sync_full",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_sync_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_syntheses",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_synthesize",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_claim",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_release",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_signal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_signals_pending",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_archive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_restore",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_spaced_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_category_add",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_dbcheck",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_vacuum",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_neighbors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_import",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_unlink",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"unlink\" in tool name"
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "c3846b488d396f340b885b4442c0845b6e5f93043a0966e7a4cd9ced7aa78437",
"stats": {
"tools": 37,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 3,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}