Brain (0001-YIDev) MCP Server
brain-mcp-server
npm
v0.3.0
Published by 0001-yidev — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (embedding-worker.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`embedding-worker.mjs:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from "child_process"; import { existsSync } from "fs"; const BATCH_SIZE = 10; const POLL_INTERVAL = 5
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server embedding-worker.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (encryption.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`encryption.mjs:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; const KEYCHAIN_SERVICE = 'claude-brain-vault'; const KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT = 'defaul
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server encryption.mjs
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (coordinator.mjs)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`coordinator.mjs:164`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch("https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages", { method: "POST", headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server coordinator.mjs
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (encryption.mjs)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`encryption.mjs:54`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ry { const result = execSync( `security find-generic-password -s "${KEYCHAIN_SERVICE}" -a "${KEYCHAIN_ACCOUNT}
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server encryption.mjs
medium Tool "brain_unlink" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "brain_unlink" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool brain_unlink
low Mutating tool "brain_unlink" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "brain_unlink" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool brain_unlink
Tools 37
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
brain_unlinkwrites filesbrain_addno sensitive capabilitybrain_archiveno sensitive capabilitybrain_auditno sensitive capabilitybrain_category_addno sensitive capabilitybrain_claimno sensitive capabilitybrain_create_summaryno sensitive capabilitybrain_dbcheckno sensitive capabilitybrain_deleteno sensitive capabilitybrain_exportno sensitive capability
Show 27 more tools ↓
brain_getno sensitive capabilitybrain_historyno sensitive capabilitybrain_importno sensitive capabilitybrain_linkno sensitive capabilitybrain_listno sensitive capabilitybrain_mark_syncedno sensitive capabilitybrain_neighborsno sensitive capabilitybrain_propose_from_transcriptno sensitive capabilitybrain_releaseno sensitive capabilitybrain_restoreno sensitive capabilitybrain_searchno sensitive capabilitybrain_signalno sensitive capabilitybrain_signals_pendingno sensitive capabilitybrain_spaced_reviewno sensitive capabilitybrain_spaced_updateno sensitive capabilitybrain_statsno sensitive capabilitybrain_statusno sensitive capabilitybrain_sync_candidatesno sensitive capabilitybrain_sync_fullno sensitive capabilitybrain_sync_pullno sensitive capabilitybrain_sync_pushno sensitive capabilitybrain_sync_statusno sensitive capabilitybrain_synthesesno sensitive capabilitybrain_synthesizeno sensitive capabilitybrain_timetravelno sensitive capabilitybrain_updateno sensitive capabilitybrain_vacuumno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
B 87/100 | 6 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan brain-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Brain 4
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 5 side by side →
Security scan results for the Brain (three-ws) MCP server.
Security scan results for the Brain (mordechaipotash) MCP server.
Security scan results for the Brain (criznguyen) MCP server.
Security scan results for the Brain (samleeney) MCP server.
More in Developer Tools
Security scan results for the 1stay MCP server.
Security scan results for the Adguard Home MCP server.
Security scan results for the Ado Browser MCP server.
Security scan results for the Adobe Experience Dev MCP server.
Security scan results for the Aemet MCP server.
Security scan results for the Affinity Mcp Bridge MCP server.