Brain — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "brain-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "brain-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "brain-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (25 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (brain_mcp/cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`brain_mcp/cli.py:515`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "brain_mcp/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"pip\", \"install\", \"fastembed>=0.5",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "brain_mcp/cli.py",
"line": 515,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (brain_mcp/dashboard/routes/settings.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`brain_mcp/dashboard/routes/settings.py:267`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "brain_mcp/dashboard/routes/settings.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"crontab\", \"-l\"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "brain_mcp/dashboard/routes/settings.py",
"line": 267,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (brain_mcp/dashboard/static/htmx.min.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`brain_mcp/dashboard/static/htmx.min.js:1`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "brain_mcp/dashboard/static/htmx.min.js"
},
"evidence": ".body,function(){return eval(e)})}function j(t){const e=Q.on(\"htmx:load\",function(e){t(e.detail.elt)});return e}function",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "brain_mcp/dashboard/static/htmx.min.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_principles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_principle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_analytics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_conversations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_conversation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "conversations_by_date",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "github_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tunnel_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dormant_contexts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "context_recovery",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tunnel_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "switching_cost",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cognitive_patterns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "open_threads",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trust_dashboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "semantic_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_summaries",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unified_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_docs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "brain_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unfinished_threads",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "what_do_i_think",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "alignment_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "thinking_trajectory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "what_was_i_thinking",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "6e68477ed150c72cc07021c583a4a9b82e2d38306a8801990d6522ca4e937a0b",
"stats": {
"tools": 25,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}