Bicameral — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "bicameral-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "bicameral-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "bicameral-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (preflight_adapters/base.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`preflight_adapters/base.py:792`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "preflight_adapters/base.py"
},
"evidence": "branch = ( subprocess.check_output( [\"git\", \"rev-parse\", \"--abbrev-ref\", \"HEAD\"],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "preflight_adapters/base.py",
"line": 792,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (preflight_adapters/state.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`preflight_adapters/state.py:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "preflight_adapters/state.py"
},
"evidence": "ry: completed = subprocess.run( [\"ps\", \"-o\", \"ppid=\", \"-p\", str(pid)], check=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "preflight_adapters/state.py",
"line": 47,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (tool_request.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`tool_request.py:415`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tool_request.py"
},
"evidence": "url = ( subprocess.check_output( [\"git\", \"config\", \"--get\", \"remote.origin.url\"],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tool_request.py",
"line": 415,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"bicameral-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "bicameral-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "bicameral.product.select",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.ingest",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.capture_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.preflight",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.lookup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.correction_findings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.bind",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.workspace.bind",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.binding.inspect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.evidence.refresh",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.review.corpus_proposals",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.review.accept_candidate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.review.reject_candidate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.review.promote_candidate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.review.request_corpus_change",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.review.approve_signoff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.review.reject_signoff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.review.resolve_compliance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.brief",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.recall.inspect_evidence",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.recall.expand_scope",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.review.contradictions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.review.triage_contradiction",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.governance.inbox",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.governance.inspect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.governance.resolve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.privacy.erase_subject.approve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.privacy.erase_subject",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.request_correction.approve",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bicameral.request_correction",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "569f9526f977d8861d1cb71e48654a6d4fe67e6fb208553284ff37368c8767d8",
"stats": {
"tools": 32,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}