Bicameral MCP Server
bicameral-mcp
PyPI
v0.17.3
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Decision ledger MCP server — ingests meeting transcripts, maps decisions to code, tracks drift
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (preflight_adapters/base.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`preflight_adapters/base.py:792`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: branch = ( subprocess.check_output( ["git", "rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server preflight_adapters/base.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (preflight_adapters/state.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`preflight_adapters/state.py:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ry: completed = subprocess.run( ["ps", "-o", "ppid=", "-p", str(pid)], check=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server preflight_adapters/state.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (tool_request.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`tool_request.py:415`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: url = ( subprocess.check_output( ["git", "config", "--get", "remote.origin.url"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tool_request.py
Tools 32
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
bicameral.bindno sensitive capabilitybicameral.binding.inspectno sensitive capabilitybicameral.briefno sensitive capabilitybicameral.capture_contextno sensitive capabilitybicameral.contextno sensitive capabilitybicameral.correction_findingsno sensitive capabilitybicameral.evidence.refreshno sensitive capabilitybicameral.governance.inboxno sensitive capabilitybicameral.governance.inspectno sensitive capabilitybicameral.governance.resolveno sensitive capability
Show 22 more tools ↓
bicameral.historyno sensitive capabilitybicameral.ingestno sensitive capabilitybicameral.lookupno sensitive capabilitybicameral.preflightno sensitive capabilitybicameral.privacy.erase_subjectno sensitive capabilitybicameral.privacy.erase_subject.approveno sensitive capabilitybicameral.product.selectno sensitive capabilitybicameral.recall.expand_scopeno sensitive capabilitybicameral.recall.inspect_evidenceno sensitive capabilitybicameral.request_correctionno sensitive capabilitybicameral.request_correction.approveno sensitive capabilitybicameral.review.accept_candidateno sensitive capabilitybicameral.review.approve_signoffno sensitive capabilitybicameral.review.contradictionsno sensitive capabilitybicameral.review.corpus_proposalsno sensitive capabilitybicameral.review.promote_candidateno sensitive capabilitybicameral.review.reject_candidateno sensitive capabilitybicameral.review.reject_signoffno sensitive capabilitybicameral.review.request_corpus_changeno sensitive capabilitybicameral.review.resolve_complianceno sensitive capabilitybicameral.review.triage_contradictionno sensitive capabilitybicameral.workspace.bindno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.17.3 latest |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v0.17.2 |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.17.1 |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
v0.17.0 |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v0.16.4 |
A 90/100 | 16 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan bicameral-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Developer Tools
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