Basic Memory MCP Server
basic-memory
PyPI
v0.23.2
Published by basicmachines-co — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Local-first knowledge base: persistent semantic notes your assistant reads and writes.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 11 = 83. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Shell/command execution in server code (integrations/hermes/__init__.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`integrations/hermes/__init__.py:375`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( [uv, "tool", "install", "basic-memory", "--quiet"], chec
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server integrations/hermes/__init__.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (integrations/openclaw/commands/slash.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`integrations/openclaw/commands/slash.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process" import { dirname, resolve } from "node:path" import { fileURLToPath } from "node:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server integrations/openclaw/commands/slash.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (integrations/openclaw/index.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`integrations/openclaw/index.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process" import { definePluginEntry } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/plugin-entry" import { Bm
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server integrations/openclaw/index.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (integrations/openclaw/commands/slash.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`integrations/openclaw/commands/slash.ts:25`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`bash "${scriptPath}"`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeout: 180_000,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server integrations/openclaw/commands/slash.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (.agents/skills/pythonic-code/scripts/run_evals.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`.agents/skills/pythonic-code/scripts/run_evals.py:272`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e: result = subprocess.run( command, stdout=events_file, std
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .agents/skills/pythonic-code/scripts/run_evals.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/scripts/read_load_bench.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/scripts/read_load_bench.py:133`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( command, check=True, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server benchmarks/scripts/read_load_bench.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/src/basic_memory_benchmarks/llm/runners.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/src/basic_memory_benchmarks/llm/runners.py:92`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: completed = subprocess.run( command, input=prompt,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server benchmarks/src/basic_memory_benchmarks/llm/runners.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/src/basic_memory_benchmarks/utils.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/src/basic_memory_benchmarks/utils.py:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: etedProcess: return subprocess.run(args, cwd=cwd, text=True, capture_output=True, check=check, env=env) def git_sh
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server benchmarks/src/basic_memory_benchmarks/utils.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (integrations/hermes/tests/test_child_env.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`integrations/hermes/tests/test_child_env.py:160`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n. """ result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", _PROBE], capture_output=True, tex
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server integrations/hermes/tests/test_child_env.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (integrations/hermes/tests/test_integration.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`integrations/hermes/tests/test_integration.py:67`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: }-") # Register subprocess.run( [_BM_BIN, "project", "add", project_name, project_dir], check=Fa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server integrations/hermes/tests/test_integration.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (integrations/openclaw/integration/bm-client.integration.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`integrations/openclaw/integration/bm-client.integration.test.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process" import { mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, stat } from "node:fs/promises" import { homedir, tmp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server integrations/openclaw/integration/bm-client.integration.test.ts
Tools 18
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fetchingests untrusted inputbasic_memory_diagnosticsno sensitive capabilitycreate_memory_projectno sensitive capabilitydelete_noteno sensitive capabilitydelete_projectno sensitive capabilityedit_noteno sensitive capabilitylist_directoryno sensitive capabilitylist_memory_projectsno sensitive capabilitymove_noteno sensitive capabilityread_noteno sensitive capability
Show 8 more tools ↓
recent_activityno sensitive capabilityschema_diffno sensitive capabilityschema_inferno sensitive capabilityschema_validateno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilitysearch_notesno sensitive capabilityview_noteno sensitive capabilitywrite_noteno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (18 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.23.2 latest |
B 83/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v0.23.0 |
B 83/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.22.1 |
B 83/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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