@baichuan-ai/baixiaoying-mcp-server
npm
v0.2.4
Published by @baichuan-ai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Baixiaoying MCP Server - 百川医学大模型 MCP 服务,支持 MCP Apps,复刻百小应的视觉样式
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Tools that read sensitive data ([baixiaoying_list_files]) and tools that can send data out ([baixiaoying_upload_file]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [baixiaoying_list_files] → sinks [baixiaoying_upload_file]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow baixiaoying_list_files → baixiaoying_upload_file
Tool "baixiaoying_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool baixiaoying_delete_file
Tool "baixiaoying_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool baixiaoying_delete_file
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
baixiaoying_delete_filewrites filesbaixiaoying_list_filesreads sensitive databaixiaoying_upload_filenetwork egressbaixiaoying_get_file_statusno sensitive capabilityCross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.4 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @baichuan-ai/baixiaoying-mcp-server --online
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