Avallon Labs MCP Server
@avallon-labs/mcp
npm
v43.3.0
Published by @avallon-labs — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Avallon API MCP server - generated from OpenAPI
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([listSecrets, getSecret]) and tools that can send data out ([sendEmail, createWorkerWebhook, createAgentWebhook, createInboxWebhook, createExtractorWebhook, deleteWebhook, getWebhook, listWebhookDeliveries, testWebhook]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [listSecrets, getSecret] → sinks [sendEmail, createWorkerWebhook, createAgentWebhook, createInboxWebhook, createExtractorWebhook, deleteWebhook, getWebh
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow listSecrets → sendEmail
Tools 152
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
createAgentWebhooknetwork egresscreateExtractorWebhooknetwork egresscreateInboxWebhooknetwork egresscreateWorkerWebhooknetwork egressdeleteWebhooknetwork egressgetSecretreads sensitive datagetWebhooknetwork egresslistSecretsreads sensitive datalistWebhookDeliveriesnetwork egresssendEmailnetwork egress
Show 142 more tools ↓
testWebhooknetwork egressaddCaseLinksno sensitive capabilityaddToolsToVoiceAgentno sensitive capabilitycancelJobno sensitive capabilitycancelWorkerRunno sensitive capabilitycheckInboxAvailabilityno sensitive capabilitycreateApiKeyno sensitive capabilitycreateArtifactno sensitive capabilitycreateCallFeedbackno sensitive capabilitycreateCaseno sensitive capabilitycreateChatno sensitive capabilitycreateChatAgentno sensitive capabilitycreateExtractorno sensitive capabilitycreateExtractorJobno sensitive capabilitycreateInboxno sensitive capabilitycreateScheduleno sensitive capabilitycreateSecretno sensitive capabilitycreateToolno sensitive capabilitycreateVoiceAgentno sensitive capabilitycreateWorkerno sensitive capabilitycreateWorkerRunno sensitive capabilitydeleteArtifactno sensitive capabilitydeleteCallFeedbackno sensitive capabilitydeleteChatAgentno sensitive capabilitydeleteEmailno sensitive capabilitydeleteExtractorno sensitive capabilitydeleteInboxno sensitive capabilitydeleteScheduleno sensitive capabilitydeleteSecretno sensitive capabilitydeleteToolno sensitive capabilitydeleteToolsFromVoiceAgentno sensitive capabilitydeleteVoiceAgentno sensitive capabilitydeleteWorkerno sensitive capabilityexecuteCodeno sensitive capabilitygetAnalyticsTimeSeriesno sensitive capabilitygetArtifactno sensitive capabilitygetArtifactMetadataKeysno sensitive capabilitygetArtifactStatusSummaryno sensitive capabilitygetArtifactUploadUrlno sensitive capabilitygetCallno sensitive capabilitygetCallAnalyticsno sensitive capabilitygetCallEvaluationno sensitive capabilitygetCaseno sensitive capabilitygetChatno sensitive capabilitygetChatAgentno sensitive capabilitygetChatAgentPromptno sensitive capabilitygetEmailno sensitive capabilitygetExtractno sensitive capabilitygetExtractCitationsno sensitive capabilitygetExtractorno sensitive capabilitygetExtractorJobno sensitive capabilitygetOAuthUrlno sensitive capabilitygetPartnerJwksno sensitive capabilitygetProfileno sensitive capabilitygetPublicChatAgentno sensitive capabilitygetScheduleno sensitive capabilitygetSessionTokenno sensitive capabilitygetToolno sensitive capabilitygetVoiceAgentno sensitive capabilitygetVoiceAgentPlaceholdersno sensitive capabilitygetVoiceAgentPromptno sensitive capabilitygetVoiceAgentVersionno sensitive capabilitygetVoiceAgentVersionChangeSummaryno sensitive capabilitygetWorkerno sensitive capabilitygetWorkerPromptno sensitive capabilitygetWorkerRunno sensitive capabilitygetWorkerVersionno sensitive capabilitygetWorkerVersionChangeSummaryno sensitive capabilityinviteTeamMemberno sensitive capabilitylistAgentWebhooksno sensitive capabilitylistApiKeysno sensitive capabilitylistArtifactsno sensitive capabilitylistCallFeedbackno sensitive capabilitylistCallsno sensitive capabilitylistCaseLinksno sensitive capabilitylistCasesno sensitive capabilitylistChatAgentsno sensitive capabilitylistChatMessagesno sensitive capabilitylistChatsno sensitive capabilitylistDispatchesno sensitive capabilitylistEmailsno sensitive capabilitylistEmailThreadsno sensitive capabilitylistExtractorJobsno sensitive capabilitylistExtractorsno sensitive capabilitylistExtractsno sensitive capabilitylistInboxesno sensitive capabilitylistInboxWebhooksno sensitive capabilitylistJobsno sensitive capabilitylistNotificationsno sensitive capabilitylistSchedulesno sensitive capabilitylistTeamInvitationsno sensitive capabilitylistTeamMembersno sensitive capabilitylistToolsno sensitive capabilitylistVoiceAgentsno sensitive capabilitylistVoiceAgentVersionsno sensitive capabilitylistWebhooksno sensitive capabilitylistWorkerModelsno sensitive capabilitylistWorkerRunMessagesno sensitive capabilitylistWorkerRunsno sensitive capabilitylistWorkersno sensitive capabilitylistWorkerVersionsno sensitive capabilitylistWorkerWebhooksno sensitive capabilitynotifyAdminno sensitive capabilitypartnerLaunchno sensitive capabilitypostChatMessageno sensitive capabilitypromoteVoiceAgentVersionno sensitive capabilitypromoteWorkerVersionno sensitive capabilityrefreshTokenno sensitive capabilityremoveCaseLinkno sensitive capabilityremoveMemberno sensitive capabilityreplyToEmailno sensitive capabilityrequestPasswordResetno sensitive capabilityresendTeamInvitationno sensitive capabilityresetPasswordno sensitive capabilityrevokeApiKeyno sensitive capabilityrevokeTeamInvitationno sensitive capabilityscheduleJobno sensitive capabilitysearchCasesno sensitive capabilitysignInno sensitive capabilitysignUpno sensitive capabilityupdateApiKeyno sensitive capabilityupdateArtifactMetadatano sensitive capabilityupdateCallControlsno sensitive capabilityupdateChatAgentno sensitive capabilityupdateChatAgentPromptno sensitive capabilityupdateExtractorno sensitive capabilityupdateInboxno sensitive capabilityupdateMemberRoleno sensitive capabilityupdateScheduleno sensitive capabilityupdateSecretno sensitive capabilityupdateToolno sensitive capabilityupdateVoiceAgentno sensitive capabilityupdateVoiceAgentModelsno sensitive capabilityupdateVoiceAgentPromptno sensitive capabilityupdateWorkerno sensitive capabilityupdateWorkerMcpsno sensitive capabilityupdateWorkerPromptno sensitive capabilityupdateWorkerRunScopeno sensitive capabilityuploadFileno sensitive capabilityworkerExecuteToolno sensitive capabilityworkerGetToolno sensitive capabilityworkerListToolsno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (152 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v43.3.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v43.1.0 |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v42.1.0 |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v41.0.0 |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v39.6.0 |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v39.3.0 |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
v39.2.0 |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
v39.0.0 |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v38.1.0 |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v38.0.0 |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-17 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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