Figma Mcp Bridge — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@atezer/figma-mcp-bridge",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@atezer/figma-mcp-bridge"
},
"server": {
"name": "@atezer/figma-mcp-bridge"
}
},
"grade": "D",
"score": {
"score": 67,
"threatScore": 78,
"grade": "D",
"band": "D",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 21.7,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-011",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (60 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (f-mcp-plugin/code.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`f-mcp-plugin/code.js:641`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "f-mcp-plugin/code.js"
},
"evidence": "E codePromise = eval(wrappedCode); } catch (syntaxError) { // Log the actual syntax error message",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "f-mcp-plugin/code.js",
"line": 641,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-011",
"title": "Assembled command execution and dynamic evaluation in the same server",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "The implementation both builds shell commands out of runtime values (`dist/core/plugin-bridge-server.js`) and evaluates runtime values as code (`f-mcp-plugin/code.js`). Each is a separate arbitrary-execution primitive; a server exposing both gives anything that reaches either one a direct path to running attacker-chosen code. These two sinks are in different files — confirm whether they are actually connected, or are unrelated code paths (e.g. a vendored bundle plus a CLI wrapper).",
"remediation": "Remove the dynamic eval, and pass command arguments as an argv array instead of building a shell string. If both are genuinely required, constrain and validate every value that can reach them.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "implementation"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rules": [
"MTC-SRC-009",
"MTC-SRC-010"
],
"commandFile": "dist/core/plugin-bridge-server.js",
"evalFile": "f-mcp-plugin/code.js",
"sameFile": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (f-mcp-plugin/code.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`f-mcp-plugin/code.js:641`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "f-mcp-plugin/code.js"
},
"evidence": "E codePromise = eval(wrappedCode); } catch (syntaxError) { // Log the actual syntax error message",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "f-mcp-plugin/code.js",
"line": 641,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/plugin-bridge-server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/plugin-bridge-server.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/plugin-bridge-server.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import { logger } from \"./logger.js\"; import { auditTool, auditPlugin } from \"./",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/core/plugin-bridge-server.js",
"line": 20,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/local-plugin-only.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/local-plugin-only.js:2135`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/local-plugin-only.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(\"https://api.figma.com/v1/me\", { headers: { \"X-Figma-Token\": token },",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/local-plugin-only.js",
"line": 2135,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/core/plugin-bridge-server.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/plugin-bridge-server.js:72`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/plugin-bridge-server.js"
},
"evidence": "const line = execSync(`ps -p ${pid} -o ppid=,comm=`, { timeout: 1000 }).toString().trim(); co",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/core/plugin-bridge-server.js",
"line": 72,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/core/bootstrap-injector.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/bootstrap-injector.js:90`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/bootstrap-injector.js"
},
"evidence": "secenek sun (a) library import (b) figma_create_mini_ds (c) template (d) linter-off — secim yapmadan createFrame YASAK\";",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/core/bootstrap-injector.js",
"line": 90,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "figma_list_connected_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_file_data",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_design_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_variables",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_component",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_styles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_execute",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_clone_screen_to_device",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_validate_screen",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_scan_ds_compliance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_create_mini_ds",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_capture_screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_set_instance_properties",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_update_variable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_create_variable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_create_variable_collection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_delete_variable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_delete_variable_collection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_rename_variable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_add_mode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_rename_mode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_design_system_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_search_components",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_instantiate_component",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_refresh_variables",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_console_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_watch_console",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_clear_console",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_set_description",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_component_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_component_for_development",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_batch_create_variables",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_batch_update_variables",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_setup_design_tokens",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_arrange_component_set",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_check_design_parity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_token_browser",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_token\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_create_frame",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_create_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_create_rectangle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_create_group",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_export_nodes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_search_assets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_code_connect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_use",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_library_variables",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_bind_variable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_import_style",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_plugin_diagnostics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_set_port",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_set_rest_token",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_clear_rest_token",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_rest_api",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_create_prototype_connection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_prototype_connections",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_pr\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "figma_set_flow_starting_point",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_create_interaction",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_set_scroll_behavior",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_rest_token_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "a86fbbe43384150c31d32ae189fe42cb83ddb770dd2295ef0ba104580f93126c",
"stats": {
"tools": 60,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}