Arifos — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "arifos",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "arifos"
},
"server": {
"name": "arifos"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (48 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (arifosmcp/core/ssh_proof.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/core/ssh_proof.py:16`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "arifosmcp/core/ssh_proof.py"
},
"evidence": "EY: Local /root/.ssh/id_ed25519 → direct signing (VPS-local) - FALLBACK: None → OBSERVER (read-only, no soverei",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "arifosmcp/core/ssh_proof.py",
"line": 16,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (arifosmcp/arifos_attestation/sbom_scan.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/arifos_attestation/sbom_scan.py:49`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "arifosmcp/arifos_attestation/sbom_scan.py"
},
"evidence": "try: out = subprocess.run( [\"pip\", \"list\", \"--format=json\"], capture_output",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "arifosmcp/arifos_attestation/sbom_scan.py",
"line": 49,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (arifosmcp/cli/common.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/cli/common.py:60`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "arifosmcp/cli/common.py"
},
"evidence": "stderr).\"\"\" proc = subprocess.run( [\"git\", *args], cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, te",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "arifosmcp/cli/common.py",
"line": 60,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (arifosmcp/core/aaa_bridge.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/core/aaa_bridge.py:186`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "arifosmcp/core/aaa_bridge.py"
},
"evidence": "). MXC equivalent: exec() \"\"\" payload = { \"agent_id\": agent_id, \"tool_name\": tool_name,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "arifosmcp/core/aaa_bridge.py",
"line": 186,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (arifosmcp/core/law.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/core/law.py:109`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "arifosmcp/core/law.py"
},
"evidence": "udo\", \"chmod\", \"eval\", \"exec(\", \"__import__\"] if any(m in value for m in manipulation):",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "arifosmcp/core/law.py",
"line": 109,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (arifosmcp/core/paradox/recursive_governance_locks.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/core/paradox/recursive_governance_locks.py:532`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "arifosmcp/core/paradox/recursive_governance_locks.py"
},
"evidence": "e\" result = subprocess.run( [\"gemini\", \"-p\", prompt], capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "arifosmcp/core/paradox/recursive_governance_locks.py",
"line": 532,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (arifosmcp/core/ssh_proof.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/core/ssh_proof.py:121`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "arifosmcp/core/ssh_proof.py"
},
"evidence": "result = subprocess.run( [SSH_KEYGEN_PATH, \"-lf\", tmp.name], capture_output=True, tex",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "arifosmcp/core/ssh_proof.py",
"line": 121,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (arifosmcp/core/threat_engine.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/core/threat_engine.py:121`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "arifosmcp/core/threat_engine.py"
},
"evidence": "ion select\", \"or 1=1\", \"exec(\", \"execute(\"] SHELL_INJECTION = [ \"; rm\", \"&& rm\", \"| sh\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "arifosmcp/core/threat_engine.py",
"line": 121,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (arifosmcp/evals/deploy_gate.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/evals/deploy_gate.py:146`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "arifosmcp/evals/deploy_gate.py"
},
"evidence": "y: result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"rev-parse\", \"HEAD\"], capture_output=True, text=True, ti",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "arifosmcp/evals/deploy_gate.py",
"line": 146,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (arifosmcp/evals/e2e_golden_paths.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/evals/e2e_golden_paths.py:80`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "arifosmcp/evals/e2e_golden_paths.py"
},
"evidence": "s result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"rev-parse\", \"HEAD\"], capture_output=True, text=True, ti",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "arifosmcp/evals/e2e_golden_paths.py",
"line": 80,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (arifosmcp/federation/constitution_aggregator.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/federation/constitution_aggregator.py:146`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "arifosmcp/federation/constitution_aggregator.py"
},
"evidence": "organ_id] mod = __import__(cfg[\"health_module\"], fromlist=[cfg[\"health_fn\"]]) fn = getattr(mod, cfg[\"hea",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "arifosmcp/federation/constitution_aggregator.py",
"line": 146,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (arifosmcp/evals/mcp_inspector_test.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`arifosmcp/evals/mcp_inspector_test.py:141`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "arifosmcp/evals/mcp_inspector_test.py"
},
"evidence": "y: result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"rev-parse\", \"HEAD\"], capture_output=True, text=True, ti",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "arifosmcp/evals/mcp_inspector_test.py",
"line": 141,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"arifos\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "arifos"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "arif_cc_sense_observe",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arif_cc_evidence_fetch",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "arif_cc_mind_reason",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arif_cc_heart_critique",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arif_cc_reply_compose",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arif_cc_memory_recall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arif_cc_session_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arif_cc_ops_vitals",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arif_cc_judge_action",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arif_cc_forge_dry_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arif_cc_gateway_handshake",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arif_cc_vault_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arif_cc_vault_dry_seal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ops_vitals",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "judge_action",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "forge_dry_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gateway_handshake",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vault_dry_seal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arifos_verify_location",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arif_judge_console",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "metabolic_vitals",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arif_ops_dashboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mcp_health_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wealth_conservation_capital",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wealth_flow_liquidity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wealth_gradient_price",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wealth_entropy_risk",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wealth_energy_productivity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wealth_time_discount",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wealth_inertia_leverage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wealth_field_macro",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wealth_signal_information",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wealth_game_coordination",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wealth_boundary_governance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wealth_hysteresis_ledger",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wealth_system_registry_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arif_claim_gate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "G02_route",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "G02_omega_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "G02_validate_axis_call",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arif_kernel_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arif_kernel_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arifos_compute_physics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arifos_compute_finance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arifos_compute_civilization",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "arifos_oracle_world",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "9bde9d3f266fb8ded0907e328f98ba34560aed5e9af9b18cb3aa77b133063e04",
"stats": {
"tools": 48,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 10,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 1
}
}
}