Arifos MCP Server
arifos
PyPI
v1!2026.8.2
Published by ariffazil — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
mcp-name: io.github.ariffazil/arifos | .ariffazil/arifos | arifOS v1!2026.7.26 — Constitutional AI Governance Kernel. 8 kernel ABI capabilities → 6 public tools (arif_verb_noun, generated from arifosmcp/abi/capability_registry.json), dynamic F1-F13 enforcement via ConstitutionKernel + FloorEvaluator, VAULT999 immutable ledger, streamable-http MCP transport. Kernel substrate for AGI/ASI federation.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (arifosmcp/core/ssh_proof.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/core/ssh_proof.py:16`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: EY: Local /root/.ssh/id_ed25519 → direct signing (VPS-local) - FALLBACK: None → OBSERVER (read-only, no soverei
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server arifosmcp/core/ssh_proof.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (arifosmcp/arifos_attestation/sbom_scan.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/arifos_attestation/sbom_scan.py:49`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: out = subprocess.run( ["pip", "list", "--format=json"], capture_output
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server arifosmcp/arifos_attestation/sbom_scan.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (arifosmcp/cli/common.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/cli/common.py:60`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: stderr).""" proc = subprocess.run( ["git", *args], cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, te
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server arifosmcp/cli/common.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (arifosmcp/core/aaa_bridge.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/core/aaa_bridge.py:186`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ). MXC equivalent: exec() """ payload = { "agent_id": agent_id, "tool_name": tool_name,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server arifosmcp/core/aaa_bridge.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (arifosmcp/core/law.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/core/law.py:109`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: udo", "chmod", "eval", "exec(", "__import__"] if any(m in value for m in manipulation):
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server arifosmcp/core/law.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (arifosmcp/core/paradox/recursive_governance_locks.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/core/paradox/recursive_governance_locks.py:532`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e" result = subprocess.run( ["gemini", "-p", prompt], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server arifosmcp/core/paradox/recursive_governance_locks.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (arifosmcp/core/ssh_proof.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/core/ssh_proof.py:121`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run( [SSH_KEYGEN_PATH, "-lf", tmp.name], capture_output=True, tex
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server arifosmcp/core/ssh_proof.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (arifosmcp/core/threat_engine.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/core/threat_engine.py:121`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ion select", "or 1=1", "exec(", "execute("] SHELL_INJECTION = [ "; rm", "&& rm", "| sh",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server arifosmcp/core/threat_engine.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (arifosmcp/evals/deploy_gate.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/evals/deploy_gate.py:146`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], capture_output=True, text=True, ti
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server arifosmcp/evals/deploy_gate.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (arifosmcp/evals/e2e_golden_paths.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/evals/e2e_golden_paths.py:80`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s result = subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], capture_output=True, text=True, ti
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server arifosmcp/evals/e2e_golden_paths.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (arifosmcp/federation/constitution_aggregator.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`arifosmcp/federation/constitution_aggregator.py:146`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: organ_id] mod = __import__(cfg["health_module"], fromlist=[cfg["health_fn"]]) fn = getattr(mod, cfg["hea
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server arifosmcp/federation/constitution_aggregator.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (arifosmcp/evals/mcp_inspector_test.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`arifosmcp/evals/mcp_inspector_test.py:141`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], capture_output=True, text=True, ti
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server arifosmcp/evals/mcp_inspector_test.py
Tools 48
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
arif_cc_evidence_fetchingests untrusted inputarifos_oracle_worldingests untrusted inputarif_cc_forge_dry_runno sensitive capabilityarif_cc_gateway_handshakeno sensitive capabilityarif_cc_heart_critiqueno sensitive capabilityarif_cc_judge_actionno sensitive capabilityarif_cc_memory_recallno sensitive capabilityarif_cc_mind_reasonno sensitive capabilityarif_cc_ops_vitalsno sensitive capabilityarif_cc_reply_composeno sensitive capability
Show 38 more tools ↓
arif_cc_sense_observeno sensitive capabilityarif_cc_session_statusno sensitive capabilityarif_cc_vault_dry_sealno sensitive capabilityarif_cc_vault_listno sensitive capabilityarif_claim_gateno sensitive capabilityarif_judge_consoleno sensitive capabilityarif_kernel_checkno sensitive capabilityarif_kernel_healthno sensitive capabilityarif_ops_dashboardno sensitive capabilityarifos_compute_civilizationno sensitive capabilityarifos_compute_financeno sensitive capabilityarifos_compute_physicsno sensitive capabilityarifos_verify_locationno sensitive capabilityforge_dry_runno sensitive capabilityG02_omega_statusno sensitive capabilityG02_routeno sensitive capabilityG02_validate_axis_callno sensitive capabilitygateway_handshakeno sensitive capabilityjudge_actionno sensitive capabilitymcp_health_checkno sensitive capabilitymetabolic_vitalsno sensitive capabilityops_vitalsno sensitive capabilitysession_statusno sensitive capabilityvault_dry_sealno sensitive capabilityvault_listno sensitive capabilitywealth_boundary_governanceno sensitive capabilitywealth_conservation_capitalno sensitive capabilitywealth_energy_productivityno sensitive capabilitywealth_entropy_riskno sensitive capabilitywealth_field_macrono sensitive capabilitywealth_flow_liquidityno sensitive capabilitywealth_game_coordinationno sensitive capabilitywealth_gradient_priceno sensitive capabilitywealth_hysteresis_ledgerno sensitive capabilitywealth_inertia_leverageno sensitive capabilitywealth_signal_informationno sensitive capabilitywealth_system_registry_statusno sensitive capabilitywealth_time_discountno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (48 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1!2026.8.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v1!2026.7.26 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v1!2026.7.24 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
v1!2026.7.17.post4 |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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