Architect To Product — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "architect-to-product",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "architect-to-product"
},
"server": {
"name": "architect-to-product"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 81,
"threatScore": 89,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 11.03,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 1.58
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (38 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/run-whitebox-audit.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/run-whitebox-audit.js:245`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/run-whitebox-audit.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync|shelljs\\.exec|child_process)\\s*[\\.(][^)]*(?:req\\.|input|params|user)/i, title: \"Command injection via",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/run-whitebox-audit.js",
"line": 245,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/setup-companions.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/setup-companions.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/setup-companions.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from \"node:fs\"; import { join",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/setup-companions.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/shake-break-setup.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/shake-break-setup.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/shake-break-setup.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from \"node:fs\"; im",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/shake-break-setup.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/shake-break-teardown.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/shake-break-teardown.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/shake-break-teardown.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync } from \"node:fs\"; import { requireProject } from \"../utils/t",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/shake-break-teardown.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/verify-test-first.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/verify-test-first.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/verify-test-first.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { requireProject } from \"../utils/tool-helpers.js\"; import { getSliceDiff",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/tools/verify-test-first.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/git.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/git.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/git.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync } from \"node:fs\"; import { join } from \"node:path\"; /** True",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/utils/git.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/process-runner.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/process-runner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/process-runner.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; /** * Run a shell command synchronously with timeout. * Returns structured res",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/utils/process-runner.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/setup-companions.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/setup-companions.js:192`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/setup-companions.js"
},
"evidence": ")[0]; try { execSync(`which ${binary} 2>/dev/null || where ${binary} 2>/dev/null`, { stdio: \"pip",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/tools/setup-companions.js",
"line": 192,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/shake-break-setup.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/shake-break-setup.js:80`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/shake-break-setup.js"
},
"evidence": "try { execSync(`lsof -ti:${port}`, { stdio: \"pipe\" }); // Port is in use, try another",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/tools/shake-break-setup.js",
"line": 80,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/shake-break-teardown.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/shake-break-teardown.js:46`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/shake-break-teardown.js"
},
"evidence": "boxPath)) { execSync(`git worktree remove --force \"${session.sandboxPath}\"`, { stdio: \"pipe\", timeout: 10000",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/tools/shake-break-teardown.js",
"line": 46,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"architect-to-product\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "architect-to-product"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "a2p_get_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_init_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_set_architecture",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_setup_companions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_create_build_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_complete_phase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_set_phase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_add_slice",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_update_slice",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_harden_requirements",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_harden_tests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_harden_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_verify_test_first",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_completion_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_get_slice_hardening_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_verify_codebase_memory_index",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_run_tests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_run_sast",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_record_finding",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_run_quality",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_run_e2e",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_generate_deployment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_get_checklist",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_get_build_log",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_run_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_run_whitebox_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_run_active_verification",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_build_signoff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_complete_adversarial_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_deploy_approval",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_acknowledge_security_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_set_secret_management",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_plan_infrastructure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_record_server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_deploy_to_server",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_verify_ssl",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"curl\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_shake_break_setup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "a2p_shake_break_teardown",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "cea0de1e5e48d00b18a71dc94e98333a23d917e53fc0e825c55c22329704e22a",
"stats": {
"tools": 38,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 7,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}