Architect To Product MCP Server
architect-to-product
npm
v2.0.2
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server that turns software architectures into tested, secure products
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 11 = 89. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −11 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×3 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 89 − 8 = 81. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/run-whitebox-audit.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/run-whitebox-audit.js:245`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync|shelljs\.exec|child_process)\s*[\.(][^)]*(?:req\.|input|params|user)/i, title: "Command injection via
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/run-whitebox-audit.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/setup-companions.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/setup-companions.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs"; import { join
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/setup-companions.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/shake-break-setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/shake-break-setup.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from "node:fs"; im
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/shake-break-setup.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/shake-break-teardown.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/shake-break-teardown.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync } from "node:fs"; import { requireProject } from "../utils/t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/shake-break-teardown.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/verify-test-first.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/verify-test-first.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { requireProject } from "../utils/tool-helpers.js"; import { getSliceDiff
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/verify-test-first.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/git.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/git.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync } from "node:fs"; import { join } from "node:path"; /** True
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/git.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/process-runner.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/process-runner.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; /** * Run a shell command synchronously with timeout. * Returns structured res
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/process-runner.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/setup-companions.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/setup-companions.js:192`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: )[0]; try { execSync(`which ${binary} 2>/dev/null || where ${binary} 2>/dev/null`, { stdio: "pip
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/setup-companions.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/shake-break-setup.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/shake-break-setup.js:80`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { execSync(`lsof -ti:${port}`, { stdio: "pipe" }); // Port is in use, try another
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/shake-break-setup.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/shake-break-teardown.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/shake-break-teardown.js:46`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: boxPath)) { execSync(`git worktree remove --force "${session.sandboxPath}"`, { stdio: "pipe", timeout: 10000
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/shake-break-teardown.js
Tools 38
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
a2p_verify_sslnetwork egressa2p_acknowledge_security_decisionno sensitive capabilitya2p_add_sliceno sensitive capabilitya2p_build_signoffno sensitive capabilitya2p_complete_adversarial_reviewno sensitive capabilitya2p_complete_phaseno sensitive capabilitya2p_completion_reviewno sensitive capabilitya2p_create_build_planno sensitive capabilitya2p_deploy_approvalno sensitive capabilitya2p_deploy_to_serverno sensitive capability
Show 28 more tools ↓
a2p_generate_deploymentno sensitive capabilitya2p_get_build_logno sensitive capabilitya2p_get_checklistno sensitive capabilitya2p_get_slice_hardening_statusno sensitive capabilitya2p_get_stateno sensitive capabilitya2p_harden_planno sensitive capabilitya2p_harden_requirementsno sensitive capabilitya2p_harden_testsno sensitive capabilitya2p_init_projectno sensitive capabilitya2p_plan_infrastructureno sensitive capabilitya2p_record_findingno sensitive capabilitya2p_record_serverno sensitive capabilitya2p_run_active_verificationno sensitive capabilitya2p_run_auditno sensitive capabilitya2p_run_e2eno sensitive capabilitya2p_run_qualityno sensitive capabilitya2p_run_sastno sensitive capabilitya2p_run_testsno sensitive capabilitya2p_run_whitebox_auditno sensitive capabilitya2p_set_architectureno sensitive capabilitya2p_set_phaseno sensitive capabilitya2p_set_secret_managementno sensitive capabilitya2p_setup_companionsno sensitive capabilitya2p_shake_break_setupno sensitive capabilitya2p_shake_break_teardownno sensitive capabilitya2p_update_sliceno sensitive capabilitya2p_verify_codebase_memory_indexno sensitive capabilitya2p_verify_test_firstno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (38 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.2 latest |
B 81/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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