@antoinefamibelle/ghost-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Published by @antoinefamibelle — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Ghost CMS — manage posts, members, newsletters, and more through Claude or any MCP-compatible LLM.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Untrusted-input tools ([invites_browse, members_browse, members_read, newsletters_browse, newsletters_read, offers_browse, offers_read, posts_browse, posts_read, roles_browse, roles_read, tags_browse, tags_read, tiers_browse, tiers_read, users_browse, users_read, webhooks_browse, webhooks_read]) co-exist with external-action tools ([webhooks_browse, webhooks_read, webhooks_edit, webhooks_delete]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [invites_browse, members_browse, members_read, newsletters_browse, newsletters_read, offers_browse, offers_read, posts_browse, posts_read, roles_brows
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow invites_browse → webhooks_browse
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
webhooks_browseingests untrusted inputnetwork egresswebhooks_readingests untrusted inputnetwork egressinvites_browseingests untrusted inputmembers_browseingests untrusted inputmembers_readingests untrusted inputnewsletters_browseingests untrusted inputnewsletters_readingests untrusted inputoffers_browseingests untrusted inputoffers_readingests untrusted inputposts_browseingests untrusted inputposts_readingests untrusted inputroles_browseingests untrusted inputroles_readingests untrusted inputtags_browseingests untrusted inputtags_readingests untrusted inputtiers_browseingests untrusted inputtiers_readingests untrusted inputusers_browseingests untrusted inputusers_readingests untrusted inputwebhooks_deletenetwork egresswebhooks_editnetwork egressinvites_addno sensitive capabilityinvites_deleteno sensitive capabilitymembers_addno sensitive capabilitymembers_deleteno sensitive capabilitymembers_editno sensitive capabilitynewsletters_addno sensitive capabilitynewsletters_deleteno sensitive capabilitynewsletters_editno sensitive capabilityoffers_addno sensitive capabilityoffers_deleteno sensitive capabilityoffers_editno sensitive capabilityposts_addno sensitive capabilityposts_deleteno sensitive capabilityposts_editno sensitive capabilitytags_addno sensitive capabilitytags_deleteno sensitive capabilitytags_editno sensitive capabilitytiers_addno sensitive capabilitytiers_deleteno sensitive capabilitytiers_editno sensitive capabilityusers_deleteno sensitive capabilityusers_editno sensitive capabilitywebhooks_addno sensitive capabilityCross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 95/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @antoinefamibelle/ghost-mcp --online
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