Anilist (yuna0x0) MCP Server
anilist-mcp
npm
v1.4.0
Source verified
Published by yuna0x0 — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
AniList MCP server for accessing AniList API data
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 3 = 97. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_user_activity, get_thread_comments]) co-exist with external-action tools ([post_message_activity]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_user_activity, get_thread_comments] → sinks [post_message_activity]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_user_activity → post_message_activity
Tools 44
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_thread_commentsingests untrusted inputget_user_activityingests untrusted inputpost_message_activitynetwork egressadd_list_entryno sensitive capabilitydelete_activityno sensitive capabilitydelete_threadno sensitive capabilityfavourite_animeno sensitive capabilityfavourite_characterno sensitive capabilityfavourite_mangano sensitive capabilityfavourite_staffno sensitive capability
Show 34 more tools ↓
favourite_studiono sensitive capabilityfollow_userno sensitive capabilityget_activityno sensitive capabilityget_animeno sensitive capabilityget_authorized_userno sensitive capabilityget_characterno sensitive capabilityget_full_user_infono sensitive capabilityget_genresno sensitive capabilityget_mangano sensitive capabilityget_media_tagsno sensitive capabilityget_recommendationno sensitive capabilityget_recommendations_for_mediano sensitive capabilityget_site_statisticsno sensitive capabilityget_staffno sensitive capabilityget_studiono sensitive capabilityget_threadno sensitive capabilityget_todays_birthday_charactersno sensitive capabilityget_todays_birthday_staffno sensitive capabilityget_user_anime_listno sensitive capabilityget_user_manga_listno sensitive capabilityget_user_profileno sensitive capabilityget_user_recent_activityno sensitive capabilityget_user_statsno sensitive capabilitypost_text_activityno sensitive capabilityremove_list_entryno sensitive capabilitysearch_activityno sensitive capabilitysearch_animeno sensitive capabilitysearch_characterno sensitive capabilitysearch_mangano sensitive capabilitysearch_staffno sensitive capabilitysearch_studiono sensitive capabilitysearch_userno sensitive capabilityupdate_list_entryno sensitive capabilityupdate_userno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.4.0 latest |
A 97/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan anilist-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Anilist 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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