Google Workspace — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@alanxchen/google-workspace-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@alanxchen/google-workspace-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@alanxchen/google-workspace-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source",
"file-write"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (47 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: read_email ⇒ list_files ⇒ send_email. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "read_email → list_files → send_email"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"read_email"
],
"sources": [
"list_files"
],
"sinks": [
"send_email"
],
"path": [
"read_email",
"list_files",
"send_email"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "read_email",
"to": "list_files",
"kind": "schema-wired"
},
{
"from": "list_files",
"to": "send_email",
"kind": "schema-wired"
}
],
"wired": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/auth.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/auth.js:33`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/auth.js"
},
"evidence": "deviceCodeResp = await fetch('https://oauth2.googleapis.com/device/code', { method: 'POST', headers: {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "build/auth.js",
"line": 33,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"delete_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"delete_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"move_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"move_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"move_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "move_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"delete_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"delete_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"move_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"move_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "move_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"@alanxchen/google-workspace-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@alanxchen/google-workspace-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"read_email"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"list_files"
],
"externalSink": [
"send_email"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"read_email",
"list_files",
"send_email"
],
"pathWired": true,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: read_email ⇒ list_files ⇒ send_email."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "search_emails",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_email",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "send_email",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "reply_to_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_draft",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trash_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mark_as_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mark_as_unread",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_labels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_label",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_unsubscribe_options",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unsubscribe_email",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_calendars",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_free_time",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "quick_add_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "copy_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "move_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"move_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "share_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_storage_quota",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_doc_structure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_doc_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_doc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "append_doc_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_sheet_values",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_sheet_values",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "append_sheet_values",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_spreadsheet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_presentation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_presentation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_slide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_contacts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_contacts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_contact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "f070870474ae520613bb8440a096fc43e7c88ae6ea4b8b252994e664091ef186",
"stats": {
"tools": 47,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 0,
"medium": 3,
"low": 2,
"info": 1
}
}
}