Google Workspace (alanxchen) MCP Server
@alanxchen/google-workspace-mcp
npm
v2.0.1
Published by @alanxchen — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Unified Google Workspace MCP Server for Gmail, Calendar, Drive, Docs, Sheets, Slides, and People
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: read_email ⇒ list_files ⇒ send_email. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow read_email → list_files → send_email
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/auth.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`build/auth.js:33`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: deviceCodeResp = await fetch('https://oauth2.googleapis.com/device/code', { method: 'POST', headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/auth.js
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
medium Tool "move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool move_file
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool move_file
Tools 47
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
delete_filewrites fileslist_filesreads sensitive datamove_filewrites filesread_emailingests untrusted inputsend_emailnetwork egressadd_labelno sensitive capabilityappend_doc_textno sensitive capabilityappend_sheet_valuesno sensitive capabilitycopy_fileno sensitive capabilitycreate_contactno sensitive capability
Show 37 more tools ↓
create_docno sensitive capabilitycreate_draftno sensitive capabilitycreate_eventno sensitive capabilitycreate_folderno sensitive capabilitycreate_presentationno sensitive capabilitycreate_slideno sensitive capabilitycreate_spreadsheetno sensitive capabilitydelete_eventno sensitive capabilityexport_fileno sensitive capabilityfind_free_timeno sensitive capabilityget_contactno sensitive capabilityget_eventno sensitive capabilityget_fileno sensitive capabilityget_file_contentno sensitive capabilityget_presentationno sensitive capabilityget_profileno sensitive capabilityget_sheet_valuesno sensitive capabilityget_storage_quotano sensitive capabilityget_unsubscribe_optionsno sensitive capabilitylist_calendarsno sensitive capabilitylist_contactsno sensitive capabilitylist_doc_structureno sensitive capabilitylist_eventsno sensitive capabilitylist_labelsno sensitive capabilitymark_as_readno sensitive capabilitymark_as_unreadno sensitive capabilityquick_add_eventno sensitive capabilityread_doc_textno sensitive capabilityreply_to_emailno sensitive capabilitysearch_contactsno sensitive capabilitysearch_emailsno sensitive capabilitysearch_filesno sensitive capabilityshare_fileno sensitive capabilitytrash_emailno sensitive capabilityunsubscribe_emailno sensitive capabilityupdate_eventno sensitive capabilityupdate_sheet_valuesno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (47 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @alanxchen/google-workspace-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Google Workspace 13
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