@akaknele/feishu-wiki-mcp
npm
v1.3.1
Published by @akaknele — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Feishu Wiki MCP Server - 飞书知识库管理工具
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from "node:child_process"; function parseArgs() { const args = process.argv.slice(2); // Env var fa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
Tool "drive_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool drive_delete_file
Tool "drive_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool drive_delete_file
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
drive_delete_filewrites filesdrive_upload_filenetwork egressim_send_messagenetwork egressbitable_create_appno sensitive capabilitybitable_create_recordno sensitive capabilitybitable_create_tableno sensitive capabilitybitable_list_fieldsno sensitive capabilitybitable_list_tablesno sensitive capabilitybitable_search_recordsno sensitive capabilitybitable_update_recordno sensitive capabilitycontact_batch_get_user_idno sensitive capabilitydoc_create_blocksno sensitive capabilitydoc_delete_blocksno sensitive capabilitydoc_get_blockno sensitive capabilitydoc_get_raw_contentno sensitive capabilitydoc_importno sensitive capabilitydoc_list_blocksno sensitive capabilitydoc_searchno sensitive capabilitydoc_update_blockno sensitive capabilitydrive_add_permissionno sensitive capabilityim_create_chatno sensitive capabilityim_get_chat_membersno sensitive capabilityim_list_chatsno sensitive capabilityim_list_messagesno sensitive capabilitywiki_copy_nodeno sensitive capabilitywiki_create_nodeno sensitive capabilitywiki_create_node_with_markdownno sensitive capabilitywiki_delete_nodeno sensitive capabilitywiki_get_nodeno sensitive capabilitywiki_get_spaceno sensitive capabilitywiki_list_nodesno sensitive capabilitywiki_list_spacesno sensitive capabilitywiki_move_docs_to_wikino sensitive capabilitywiki_move_nodeno sensitive capabilitywiki_searchno sensitive capabilitywiki_update_titleno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @akaknele/feishu-wiki-mcp --online
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