Adobe (VoidChecksum) MCP Server
adobe-mcp
npm
v0.1.0
Published by voidchecksum — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Tool "adobe_run_powershell" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "adobe_run_powershell" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "powershell"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool adobe_run_powershell
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/adobe-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/adobe-mcp.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/adobe-mcp.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (server/adobe_mcp.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`server/adobe_mcp.py:163`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server server/adobe_mcp.py
medium Tool "adobe_save_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "adobe_save_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "save_file"). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool adobe_save_file
low Mutating tool "adobe_run_powershell" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "adobe_run_powershell" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool adobe_run_powershell
low Mutating tool "adobe_save_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "adobe_save_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool adobe_save_file
Tools 45
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
adobe_run_powershellruns code / shelladobe_save_filewrites filesadobe_ae_compno sensitive capabilityadobe_ae_effectno sensitive capabilityadobe_ae_expressionno sensitive capabilityadobe_ae_layerno sensitive capabilityadobe_ae_propertyno sensitive capabilityadobe_ae_renderno sensitive capabilityadobe_ai_exportno sensitive capabilityadobe_ai_new_documentno sensitive capabilityadobe_ai_pathno sensitive capabilityadobe_ai_shapesno sensitive capabilityadobe_ai_textno sensitive capabilityadobe_ame_encodeno sensitive capabilityadobe_an_documentno sensitive capabilityadobe_an_timelineno sensitive capabilityadobe_app_statusno sensitive capabilityadobe_close_documentno sensitive capabilityadobe_get_doc_infono sensitive capabilityadobe_id_documentno sensitive capabilityadobe_id_imageno sensitive capabilityadobe_id_textno sensitive capabilityadobe_launch_appno sensitive capabilityadobe_list_appsno sensitive capabilityadobe_list_fontsno sensitive capabilityadobe_open_fileno sensitive capabilityadobe_pr_effectsno sensitive capabilityadobe_pr_exportno sensitive capabilityadobe_pr_mediano sensitive capabilityadobe_pr_projectno sensitive capabilityadobe_pr_sequenceno sensitive capabilityadobe_pr_timelineno sensitive capabilityadobe_ps_actionno sensitive capabilityadobe_ps_adjustmentno sensitive capabilityadobe_ps_batchno sensitive capabilityadobe_ps_exportno sensitive capabilityadobe_ps_filterno sensitive capabilityadobe_ps_layersno sensitive capabilityadobe_ps_new_documentno sensitive capabilityadobe_ps_selectionno sensitive capabilityadobe_ps_smart_objectno sensitive capabilityadobe_ps_textno sensitive capabilityadobe_ps_transformno sensitive capabilityadobe_run_jsxno sensitive capabilityadobe_run_jsx_fileno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (45 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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