Ainative Zerodb MCP Server
ainative-zerodb-mcp-server
npm
v2.3.2
Published by ainative-studio — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
AINative ZeroDB MCP Server - 77 operations for vector search, TurboQuant vector compression (PolarQuant + QJL), NoSQL, dedicated PostgreSQL management, files, events, RLHF, and persistent memory for AI agents with enterprise security. All tools annotated
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: zerodb_download_file → zerodb_get_postgres_logs → zerodb_subscribe_events. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow zerodb_download_file → zerodb_get_postgres_logs → zerodb_subscribe_events
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "zerodb_subscribe_events"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "zerodb_subscribe_events" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool zerodb_subscribe_events · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url
medium Tool "zerodb_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "zerodb_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool zerodb_delete_file
low Mutating tool "zerodb_delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "zerodb_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool zerodb_delete_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_id" on "zerodb_delete_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "zerodb_delete_file" takes a path parameter "file_id" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool zerodb_delete_file · inputSchema.properties.file_id
Tools 77
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
zerodb_delete_filewrites fileszerodb_download_fileingests untrusted inputzerodb_export_vectorsingests untrusted inputzerodb_generate_presigned_urlingests untrusted inputzerodb_get_postgres_logsreads sensitive datazerodb_list_eventsingests untrusted inputzerodb_list_filesreads sensitive datazerodb_list_vectorsingests untrusted inputzerodb_postgres_queryreads sensitive datazerodb_subscribe_eventsnetwork egress
Show 67 more tools ↓
zerodb_upload_filenetwork egresszerodb_admin_healthno sensitive capabilityzerodb_admin_list_projectsno sensitive capabilityzerodb_admin_optimizeno sensitive capabilityzerodb_admin_system_statsno sensitive capabilityzerodb_admin_user_usageno sensitive capabilityzerodb_batch_upsert_vectorsno sensitive capabilityzerodb_create_eventno sensitive capabilityzerodb_create_projectno sensitive capabilityzerodb_create_tableno sensitive capabilityzerodb_create_vector_indexno sensitive capabilityzerodb_delete_postgresno sensitive capabilityzerodb_delete_projectno sensitive capabilityzerodb_delete_rowsno sensitive capabilityzerodb_delete_tableno sensitive capabilityzerodb_delete_vectorno sensitive capabilityzerodb_embed_and_storeno sensitive capabilityzerodb_enable_databaseno sensitive capabilityzerodb_event_statsno sensitive capabilityzerodb_generate_embeddingsno sensitive capabilityzerodb_get_contextno sensitive capabilityzerodb_get_eventno sensitive capabilityzerodb_get_file_metadatano sensitive capabilityzerodb_get_postgres_connectionno sensitive capabilityzerodb_get_postgres_statusno sensitive capabilityzerodb_get_postgres_usageno sensitive capabilityzerodb_get_projectno sensitive capabilityzerodb_get_project_statsno sensitive capabilityzerodb_get_tableno sensitive capabilityzerodb_get_vectorno sensitive capabilityzerodb_insert_rowsno sensitive capabilityzerodb_list_projectsno sensitive capabilityzerodb_list_tablesno sensitive capabilityzerodb_optimize_vectorsno sensitive capabilityzerodb_postgres_backupno sensitive capabilityzerodb_postgres_create_tableno sensitive capabilityzerodb_postgres_restoreno sensitive capabilityzerodb_postgres_schema_infono sensitive capabilityzerodb_postgres_statsno sensitive capabilityzerodb_provision_postgresno sensitive capabilityzerodb_quantum_compressno sensitive capabilityzerodb_quantum_decompressno sensitive capabilityzerodb_quantum_feature_mapno sensitive capabilityzerodb_quantum_hybrid_searchno sensitive capabilityzerodb_quantum_kernelno sensitive capabilityzerodb_quantum_optimizeno sensitive capabilityzerodb_query_rowsno sensitive capabilityzerodb_renew_tokenno sensitive capabilityzerodb_restart_postgresno sensitive capabilityzerodb_rlhf_agent_feedbackno sensitive capabilityzerodb_rlhf_broadcastno sensitive capabilityzerodb_rlhf_errorno sensitive capabilityzerodb_rlhf_interactionno sensitive capabilityzerodb_rlhf_sessionno sensitive capabilityzerodb_rlhf_startno sensitive capabilityzerodb_rlhf_statusno sensitive capabilityzerodb_rlhf_stopno sensitive capabilityzerodb_rlhf_summaryno sensitive capabilityzerodb_rlhf_workflowno sensitive capabilityzerodb_search_memoryno sensitive capabilityzerodb_search_vectorsno sensitive capabilityzerodb_semantic_searchno sensitive capabilityzerodb_store_memoryno sensitive capabilityzerodb_update_projectno sensitive capabilityzerodb_update_rowsno sensitive capabilityzerodb_upsert_vectorno sensitive capabilityzerodb_vector_statsno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (77 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.3.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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