Aidd App — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@aidd-app/mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@aidd-app/mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@aidd-app/mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 84,
"threatScore": 91,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 9.45,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/applescript.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/applescript.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/applescript.js"
},
"evidence": "import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); /** * Exec",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/applescript.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index-browser-auth.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index-browser-auth.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index-browser-auth.js"
},
"evidence": "; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import * as http from 'http'; import * as crypto from 'crypto'; import * as fs f",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index-browser-auth.js",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index-oauth-browser.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index-oauth-browser.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index-oauth-browser.js"
},
"evidence": "n import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import * as http from 'http'; import * as cryp",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index-oauth-browser.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/oauth-flow.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/oauth-flow.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/oauth-flow.js"
},
"evidence": "; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); /** * Brow",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/oauth-flow.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/oauth-server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/oauth-server.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/oauth-server.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs/promises'; import * as path from 'path'; import * as os",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/oauth-server.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index-aidd-auth.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index-aidd-auth.js:137`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index-aidd-auth.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch('https://aidd-backend-prod-739193356129.us-central1.run.app/api/auth/signin', {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/index-aidd-auth.js",
"line": 137,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/oauth-server.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/oauth-server.js:237`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/oauth-server.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch('https://aidd-backend-prod-739193356129.us-central1.run.app/oauth/token', { me",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/oauth-server.js",
"line": 237,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/server.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:148`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/server.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch('https://aidd-backend-prod-739193356129.us-central1.run.app/oauth/token', {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/server.js",
"line": 148,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index-browser-auth.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index-browser-auth.js:915`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index-browser-auth.js"
},
"evidence": "-open'; exec(`${openCommand} \"${loginUrl}\"`, (error) => { if (error) {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/index-browser-auth.js",
"line": 915,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index-oauth-browser.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index-oauth-browser.js:281`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index-oauth-browser.js"
},
"evidence": "-open'; exec(`${openCommand} \"${authUrl.toString()}\"`, (error) => { if (error) {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/index-oauth-browser.js",
"line": 281,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_action_items",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_action_item",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_action_item",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_action_items",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_to_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "score_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_ai_jobs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_action_item",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_action_items",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aidd_overview_tutorial",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Action Items",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Authentication Status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Authentication Guide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "authenticate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "sign_in",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "configure_auth",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_auth_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "sign_out",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "start_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import_notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import_apple_notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "connect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "disconnect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_backend_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Backend Health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "sync_to_services",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Connection Status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_folders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bulk_import",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Recent Notes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Note Folders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Notes Statistics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "63df126e3350c985028f41e106a867553d678b7edaa61d6a9c3feefaea3da73c",
"stats": {
"tools": 49,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 5,
"medium": 5,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}