Aidd App MCP Server
@aidd-app/mcp
npm
v4.3.29
Published by @aidd-app — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Official AiDD MCP Web Connector - Comprehensive ADHD-optimized productivity platform with AI-powered task management, action item extraction, and multi-service sync. Accessible from Claude web, mobile, and desktop.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 9.5 = 91. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 91 − 7 = 84. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/applescript.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/applescript.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); /** * Exec
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/applescript.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index-browser-auth.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index-browser-auth.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import * as http from 'http'; import * as crypto from 'crypto'; import * as fs f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index-browser-auth.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index-oauth-browser.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index-oauth-browser.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import * as http from 'http'; import * as cryp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index-oauth-browser.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/oauth-flow.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/oauth-flow.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); /** * Brow
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/oauth-flow.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/oauth-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/oauth-server.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs/promises'; import * as path from 'path'; import * as os
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/oauth-server.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index-aidd-auth.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/index-aidd-auth.js:137`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://aidd-backend-prod-739193356129.us-central1.run.app/api/auth/signin', {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index-aidd-auth.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/oauth-server.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/oauth-server.js:237`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://aidd-backend-prod-739193356129.us-central1.run.app/oauth/token', { me
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/oauth-server.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/server.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:148`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://aidd-backend-prod-739193356129.us-central1.run.app/oauth/token', {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index-browser-auth.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/index-browser-auth.js:915`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: -open'; exec(`${openCommand} "${loginUrl}"`, (error) => { if (error) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index-browser-auth.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index-oauth-browser.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/index-oauth-browser.js:281`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: -open'; exec(`${openCommand} "${authUrl.toString()}"`, (error) => { if (error) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index-oauth-browser.js
Tools 49
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
Action Itemsno sensitive capabilityaidd_overview_tutorialno sensitive capabilityauthenticateno sensitive capabilityAuthentication Guideno sensitive capabilityAuthentication Statusno sensitive capabilityBackend Healthno sensitive capabilitybulk_importno sensitive capabilitycheck_ai_jobsno sensitive capabilitycheck_auth_statusno sensitive capabilitycheck_backend_healthno sensitive capability
Show 39 more tools ↓
configure_authno sensitive capabilityconnectno sensitive capabilityConnection Statusno sensitive capabilityconvert_to_tasksno sensitive capabilitycreate_action_itemno sensitive capabilitycreate_noteno sensitive capabilitycreate_taskno sensitive capabilitydelete_action_itemsno sensitive capabilitydelete_noteno sensitive capabilitydelete_notesno sensitive capabilitydelete_tasksno sensitive capabilitydisconnectno sensitive capabilityexport_notesno sensitive capabilityextract_action_itemsno sensitive capabilityimport_apple_notesno sensitive capabilityimport_notesno sensitive capabilitylist_action_itemsno sensitive capabilitylist_foldersno sensitive capabilitylist_notesno sensitive capabilitylist_tasksno sensitive capabilityNote Foldersno sensitive capabilityNotesno sensitive capabilityNotes Statisticsno sensitive capabilityread_action_itemno sensitive capabilityread_noteno sensitive capabilityread_taskno sensitive capabilityRecent Notesno sensitive capabilityscore_tasksno sensitive capabilitysearch_notesno sensitive capabilitysession_statusno sensitive capabilitysign_inno sensitive capabilitysign_outno sensitive capabilitystart_workflowno sensitive capabilitystatusno sensitive capabilitysync_to_servicesno sensitive capabilityTasksno sensitive capabilityupdate_action_itemno sensitive capabilityupdate_noteno sensitive capabilityupdate_taskno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v4.3.29 latest |
B 84/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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