Ai Lab Testing — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "ai-lab-testing",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "ai-lab-testing"
},
"server": {
"name": "ai-lab-testing"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (lab_testing/utils/credentials.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/utils/credentials.py:142`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lab_testing/utils/credentials.py"
},
"evidence": "Path.home() / \".ssh\" / \"id_rsa.pub\" if not ssh_key_path.exists(): ssh_key_path = Path.home() / \".ssh\" / \"id_",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "lab_testing/utils/credentials.py",
"line": 142,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"ssh_to_device\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_to_device\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_to_device"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"batch_operation\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"batch_operation\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "batch_operation"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/resources/network_status.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/resources/network_status.py:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lab_testing/resources/network_status.py"
},
"evidence": "route_result = subprocess.run( [\"ip\", \"route\", \"show\"], check=False, capture_output=True, text=True",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "lab_testing/resources/network_status.py",
"line": 20,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/tools/device_manager.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/tools/device_manager.py:107`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lab_testing/tools/device_manager.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"ping\", \"-c\", \"3\", \"-W\", \"2\", ip], check=False,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "lab_testing/tools/device_manager.py",
"line": 107,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/tools/device_verification.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/tools/device_verification.py:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lab_testing/tools/device_verification.py"
},
"evidence": "s: result = subprocess.run( [ \"ssh\", \"-o\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "lab_testing/tools/device_verification.py",
"line": 47,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/tools/network_mapper.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/tools/network_mapper.py:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lab_testing/tools/network_mapper.py"
},
"evidence": "time() result = subprocess.run( [\"ping\", \"-c\", \"1\", \"-W\", str(timeout), ip], check=False",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "lab_testing/tools/network_mapper.py",
"line": 29,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/tools/power_monitor.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/tools/power_monitor.py:98`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lab_testing/tools/power_monitor.py"
},
"evidence": "try: process = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True) return",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "lab_testing/tools/power_monitor.py",
"line": 98,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/tools/remote_access.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/tools/remote_access.py:97`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lab_testing/tools/remote_access.py"
},
"evidence": "t}\"]) result = subprocess.run(ssh_cmd, check=False, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) if res",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "lab_testing/tools/remote_access.py",
"line": 97,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/tools/tasmota_control.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/tools/tasmota_control.py:70`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lab_testing/tools/tasmota_control.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run(cmd, check=False, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) if result.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "lab_testing/tools/tasmota_control.py",
"line": 70,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/tools/vpn_manager.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/tools/vpn_manager.py:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lab_testing/tools/vpn_manager.py"
},
"evidence": "rfaces result = subprocess.run( [\"wg\", \"show\"], check=False, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "lab_testing/tools/vpn_manager.py",
"line": 20,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/tools/vpn_setup.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/tools/vpn_setup.py:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lab_testing/tools/vpn_setup.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [\"wg\", \"--version\"], check=False, capture_output=True, text=True, ti",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "lab_testing/tools/vpn_setup.py",
"line": 20,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/utils/credentials.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/utils/credentials.py:103`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lab_testing/utils/credentials.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( [ \"ssh\", \"-o\", \"Batc",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "lab_testing/utils/credentials.py",
"line": 103,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"ssh_to_device\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_to_device\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_to_device",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"batch_operation\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"batch_operation\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "batch_operation",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"ssh_to_device\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ssh_to_device\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_to_device"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"batch_operation\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"batch_operation\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "batch_operation"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_devices",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_device",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_to_device",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "vpn_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "connect_vpn",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "disconnect_vpn",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vpn_setup_instructions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_wireguard_installed",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_vpn_configs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_vpn_config_template",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "setup_networkmanager_vpn",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vpn_statistics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_network_map",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_device_identity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_device_by_ip",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_device_ip",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "start_power_monitoring",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_power_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tasmota_control",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tasmota_devices",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "power_cycle_device",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "help",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_ota_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trigger_ota_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_containers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deploy_container",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_system_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_firmware_version",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch_operation",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "regression_test",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_device_groups",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_power_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_low_power",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compare_power_profiles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "a356a67bf03270cf56c854a1902ce55ff4da233381683d70e4b9fcc453b1a4f8",
"stats": {
"tools": 34,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 13,
"medium": 2,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}