Ai Lab Testing MCP Server
ai-lab-testing
PyPI
v0.2.0
Published by dynamicdevices — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 17
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (lab_testing/utils/credentials.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/utils/credentials.py:142`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Path.home() / ".ssh" / "id_rsa.pub" if not ssh_key_path.exists(): ssh_key_path = Path.home() / ".ssh" / "id_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lab_testing/utils/credentials.py
high Tool "ssh_to_device" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_to_device" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_to_device
high Tool "batch_operation" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "batch_operation" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool batch_operation
high Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/resources/network_status.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/resources/network_status.py:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: route_result = subprocess.run( ["ip", "route", "show"], check=False, capture_output=True, text=True
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lab_testing/resources/network_status.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/tools/device_manager.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/tools/device_manager.py:107`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["ping", "-c", "3", "-W", "2", ip], check=False,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lab_testing/tools/device_manager.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/tools/device_verification.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/tools/device_verification.py:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s: result = subprocess.run( [ "ssh", "-o",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lab_testing/tools/device_verification.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/tools/network_mapper.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/tools/network_mapper.py:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: time() result = subprocess.run( ["ping", "-c", "1", "-W", str(timeout), ip], check=False
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lab_testing/tools/network_mapper.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/tools/power_monitor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/tools/power_monitor.py:98`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: process = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True) return
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lab_testing/tools/power_monitor.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/tools/remote_access.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/tools/remote_access.py:97`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t}"]) result = subprocess.run(ssh_cmd, check=False, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) if res
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lab_testing/tools/remote_access.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/tools/tasmota_control.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/tools/tasmota_control.py:70`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run(cmd, check=False, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) if result.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lab_testing/tools/tasmota_control.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/tools/vpn_manager.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/tools/vpn_manager.py:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rfaces result = subprocess.run( ["wg", "show"], check=False, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lab_testing/tools/vpn_manager.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/tools/vpn_setup.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/tools/vpn_setup.py:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["wg", "--version"], check=False, capture_output=True, text=True, ti
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lab_testing/tools/vpn_setup.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (lab_testing/utils/credentials.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lab_testing/utils/credentials.py:103`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( [ "ssh", "-o", "Batc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lab_testing/utils/credentials.py
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "ssh_to_device"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "ssh_to_device" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool ssh_to_device · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "batch_operation"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "batch_operation" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool batch_operation · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "ssh_to_device" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_to_device" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_to_device
low Mutating tool "batch_operation" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "batch_operation" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool batch_operation
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
batch_operationruns code / shellssh_to_deviceruns code / shellanalyze_power_logsno sensitive capabilitycheck_ota_statusno sensitive capabilitycheck_wireguard_installedno sensitive capabilitycompare_power_profilesno sensitive capabilityconnect_vpnno sensitive capabilitycreate_network_mapno sensitive capabilitycreate_vpn_config_templateno sensitive capabilitydeploy_containerno sensitive capability
Show 24 more tools ↓
disconnect_vpnno sensitive capabilityget_device_groupsno sensitive capabilityget_firmware_versionno sensitive capabilityget_power_logsno sensitive capabilityget_system_statusno sensitive capabilityhelpno sensitive capabilitylist_containersno sensitive capabilitylist_devicesno sensitive capabilitylist_tasmota_devicesno sensitive capabilitylist_vpn_configsno sensitive capabilitymonitor_low_powerno sensitive capabilitypower_cycle_deviceno sensitive capabilityregression_testno sensitive capabilitysetup_networkmanager_vpnno sensitive capabilitystart_power_monitoringno sensitive capabilitytasmota_controlno sensitive capabilitytest_deviceno sensitive capabilitytrigger_ota_updateno sensitive capabilityupdate_device_ipno sensitive capabilityverify_device_by_ipno sensitive capabilityverify_device_identityno sensitive capabilityvpn_setup_instructionsno sensitive capabilityvpn_statisticsno sensitive capabilityvpn_statusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 17 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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