Ai Cortex — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "ai-cortex",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "ai-cortex"
},
"server": {
"name": "ai-cortex"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"file-write",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/web/graph/app3d.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/web/graph/app3d.js:75`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/web/graph/app3d.js"
},
"evidence": "); let { Body } = new Function(code)(); return Body; } function generateCreateBodyFunctionBody(dimen",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "dist/web/graph/app3d.js",
"line": 75,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/web/graph/app3d.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/web/graph/app3d.js:75`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/web/graph/app3d.js"
},
"evidence": "); let { Body } = new Function(code)(); return Body; } function generateCreateBodyFunctionBody(dimen",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/web/graph/app3d.js",
"line": 75,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/cli/graph.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/cli/graph.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/cli/graph.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { fileURLToPath } from \"node:url\"; import { loadRepoStores } from \"../lib",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/cli/graph.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/lib/cache-store-migrate.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/lib/cache-store-migrate.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/lib/cache-store-migrate.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import Database from \"better-sqlite3\"; export const SENTINEL_NAME = \".migration-",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/lib/cache-store-migrate.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/lib/cache-store.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/lib/cache-store.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/lib/cache-store.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { exec } from \"node:child_process\"; import fs from \"node:fs\"; import os from \"node:os\"; import path from \"node:path\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/lib/cache-store.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/lib/diff-files.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/lib/diff-files.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/lib/diff-files.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { exec } from \"node:child_process\"; import fs from \"node:fs\"; import path from \"node:path\"; import { promisify } fro",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/lib/diff-files.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/lib/indexable-files.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/lib/indexable-files.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/lib/indexable-files.js"
},
"evidence": "ort { exec } from \"node:child_process\"; import fs from \"node:fs\"; import path from \"node:path\"; import { promisify } fro",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/lib/indexable-files.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/lib/repo-identity.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/lib/repo-identity.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/lib/repo-identity.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { createHash } from \"node:crypto\"; import fs from \"node:fs\"; import path",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/lib/repo-identity.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/lib/update-notifier.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/lib/update-notifier.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/lib/update-notifier.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; const CACHE_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; const FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000; const",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/lib/update-notifier.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/server/graph-server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/server/graph-server.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/server/graph-server.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { loadRepoStores } from \"../lib/graph/load.js\"; import { buildGraph } fro",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/server/graph-server.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"unlink_memories\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"unlink_memories\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"unlink\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "unlink_memories"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"unlink_memories\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"unlink_memories\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "unlink_memories"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/src/lib/library/__tests__/source-registry.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/src/lib/library/__tests__/source-registry.test.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/lib/library/__tests__/source-registry.test.js"
},
"evidence": "ecFileSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import fs from \"node:fs\"; import os from \"node:os\"; import path from \"node:path\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/lib/library/__tests__/source-registry.test.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "rehydrate_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suggest_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suggest_files_deep",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suggest_files_semantic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "index_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "blast_radius",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "recall_memory",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_memory",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "audit_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_scope",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deprecate_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "restore_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "merge_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trash_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "untrash_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "purge_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "link_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unlink_memories",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"unlink\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "pin_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unpin_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "confirm_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_evidence",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rebuild_index",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "sweep_aging",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "promote_to_global",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "capture_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_memories_pending_rewrite",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "review_pending_captures",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rewrite_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "library_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "library_register_source",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "library_list_sources",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "library_reindex",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "9fc1bfe3c48d721c314f3ec261ff588fe2845cb734a41a13313d1ca78899141d",
"stats": {
"tools": 39,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 10,
"medium": 1,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}