Agentic Sdlc — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "agentic-sdlc-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "agentic-sdlc-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "agentic-sdlc-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (13 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/review/pull-request-review.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/review/pull-request-review.js:69`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/review/pull-request-review.js"
},
"evidence": "?? lower; return ([\".npmrc\", \"package.json\", \"server.json\"].includes(basename) || /(?:^|\\/)version\\.[cm]?[j",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/review/pull-request-review.js",
"line": 69,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([repo_context]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_issue_set, repo_context]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "repo_context → create_issue_set"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [repo_context] → sinks [create_issue_set, repo_context]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"repo_context"
],
"sinks": [
"create_issue_set",
"repo_context"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"repo_context"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"create_issue_set",
"repo_context"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "agent_handoff_packet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "branch_protection_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_issue_set",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"create_issue\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "create_pr_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plan_from_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prepare_work_item",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "quality_gate_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "release_readiness_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "repo_context",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
],
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"open_pr\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "review_pr_against_standard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "sdlc_evidence_packet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "security_triage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "workflow_permissions_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "000431cb6b167a59d325d5502130ce057f6195e8cb0d6eba72f3f0f58922dbe1",
"stats": {
"tools": 13,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}