Agentic Sdlc MCP Server
agentic-sdlc-mcp
npm
v1.9.0
Source verified
Published by sakuracianna — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
An MCP Server acting as an Agentic SDLC Control Plane — helps AI coding agents plan, create, test, review, secure, and release software following GitHub Agentic AI best practices.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/review/pull-request-review.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/review/pull-request-review.js:69`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ?? lower; return ([".npmrc", "package.json", "server.json"].includes(basename) || /(?:^|\/)version\.[cm]?[j
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/review/pull-request-review.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([repo_context]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_issue_set, repo_context]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [repo_context] → sinks [create_issue_set, repo_context]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow repo_context → create_issue_set
Tools 13
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
repo_contextingests untrusted inputnetwork egresscreate_issue_setnetwork egressagent_handoff_packetno sensitive capabilitybranch_protection_statusno sensitive capabilitycreate_pr_summaryno sensitive capabilityplan_from_contextno sensitive capabilityprepare_work_itemno sensitive capabilityquality_gate_statusno sensitive capabilityrelease_readiness_checkno sensitive capabilityreview_pr_against_standardno sensitive capability
Show 3 more tools ↓
sdlc_evidence_packetno sensitive capabilitysecurity_triageno sensitive capabilityworkflow_permissions_auditno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (13 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.9.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.8.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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