Agent Ssh MCP Server
agent-ssh
npm
v1.1.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
SSH remote management CLI - execute commands, transfer files, and perform remote file operations (read/write/edit/find/grep/ls)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.8 = 98. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.8 | Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata ×2 MTC-INJ-TARGET-1 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 98 − 12 = 86. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: ssh_download_directory → ssh_execute_command → ssh_upload_file. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow ssh_download_directory → ssh_execute_command → ssh_upload_file
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "ssh_execute_command"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "ssh_execute_command" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow ssh_execute_command
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/tools/executeCommand.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/executeCommand.js:96`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ateKey="/home/user/.ssh/id_rsa" Error Handling: - Returns "Error: Authentication failed" if credentials are incorr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/executeCommand.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/tools/fileTransfer.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/fileTransfer.js:115`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ateKey="/home/user/.ssh/id_rsa" Error Handling: - Returns "Error: Local file does not exist" if the local file pat
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/fileTransfer.js
high Tool "ssh_execute_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "ssh_execute_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool ssh_execute_command
medium Tool "ssh_write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "ssh_write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool ssh_write_file
medium Tool "ssh_edit_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "ssh_edit_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "edit_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool ssh_edit_file
low Mutating tool "ssh_execute_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_execute_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_execute_command
low Mutating tool "ssh_write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_write_file
low Mutating tool "ssh_edit_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ssh_edit_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ssh_edit_file
low Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadataMTC-INJ-TARGET-1
Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata detected in the description of tool "ssh_execute_command". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: id_rsa
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool ssh_execute_command · description
low Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadataMTC-INJ-TARGET-1
Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata detected in the description of tool "ssh_upload_file". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: id_rsa
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool ssh_upload_file · description
Tools 12
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ssh_execute_commandreads sensitive dataruns code / shellssh_download_directoryingests untrusted inputssh_download_fileingests untrusted inputssh_edit_filewrites filesssh_read_filereads sensitive datassh_upload_filenetwork egressssh_write_filewrites filesssh_find_filesno sensitive capabilityssh_grepno sensitive capabilityssh_list_dirno sensitive capability
Show 2 more tools ↓
ssh_list_serversno sensitive capabilityssh_upload_directoryno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 2
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (12 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.0 latest |
B 86/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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