Agent Collab — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "agent-collab-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "agent-collab-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "agent-collab-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/dispatch.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/dispatch.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/dispatch.js"
},
"evidence": "spawn, execSync } from \"child_process\"; import path from \"path\"; import fs from \"fs\"; import { getEngineMode, getRole, g",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/dispatch.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/index.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from \"child_process\"; import path from \"path\"; import fs from \"fs\"; import { registerStatusTools } fro",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/index.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (build/dispatch.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/dispatch.js:15`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/dispatch.js"
},
"evidence": "md) { try { execSync(`which ${cmd}`, { stdio: \"ignore\" }); return true; } catch { re",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "build/dispatch.js",
"line": 15,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/tools/setup.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/tools/setup.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools/setup.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import { getDb, setActiveStrategy, setEngineMode, getRole, getProjectDir, setPro",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/tools/setup.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/tools/status.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/tools/status.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/tools/status.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import fs from \"fs\"; import path from \"path\"; import { getDb, getRole, getActive",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/tools/status.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "add_comment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_comments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "log_activity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trigger_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "notify_builder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "invoke_architect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_loop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "archive_epic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_epics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_epic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_codebase_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "restore_epic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_metrics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reserve_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "release_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_conflicts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_review_feedback",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "review_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "setup_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_dashboard_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_my_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_project_overview",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_strategies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_active_strategy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_strategy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_engine_mode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "claim_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "submit_for_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cancel_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "041c23574f173b1ccba66e41dd902d9db16e6ac2adb34e686053e6c4f94a19eb",
"stats": {
"tools": 34,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 1,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}