Agent Collab (dolores-r2d2) MCP Server
agent-collab-mcp
npm
v2.3.0
Published by dolores-r2d2 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/dispatch.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/dispatch.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn, execSync } from "child_process"; import path from "path"; import fs from "fs"; import { getEngineMode, getRole, g
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/dispatch.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import path from "path"; import fs from "fs"; import { registerStatusTools } fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (build/dispatch.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`build/dispatch.js:15`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: md) { try { execSync(`which ${cmd}`, { stdio: "ignore" }); return true; } catch { re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/dispatch.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/tools/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/tools/setup.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { getDb, setActiveStrategy, setEngineMode, getRole, getProjectDir, setPro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/setup.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/tools/status.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/tools/status.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import fs from "fs"; import path from "path"; import { getDb, getRole, getActive
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/status.js
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_commentno sensitive capabilityarchive_epicno sensitive capabilitycancel_taskno sensitive capabilitycheck_conflictsno sensitive capabilityclaim_taskno sensitive capabilitycreate_taskno sensitive capabilityget_active_strategyno sensitive capabilityget_codebase_contextno sensitive capabilityget_commentsno sensitive capabilityget_contextno sensitive capability
Show 24 more tools ↓
get_dashboard_infono sensitive capabilityget_epicno sensitive capabilityget_metricsno sensitive capabilityget_my_statusno sensitive capabilityget_project_overviewno sensitive capabilityget_review_feedbackno sensitive capabilityget_taskno sensitive capabilityinvoke_architectno sensitive capabilitylist_epicsno sensitive capabilitylist_strategiesno sensitive capabilitylog_activityno sensitive capabilitynotify_builderno sensitive capabilityrelease_filesno sensitive capabilityreserve_filesno sensitive capabilityrestore_epicno sensitive capabilityreview_taskno sensitive capabilityrun_loopno sensitive capabilitysave_planno sensitive capabilityset_contextno sensitive capabilityset_engine_modeno sensitive capabilityset_strategyno sensitive capabilitysetup_projectno sensitive capabilitysubmit_for_reviewno sensitive capabilitytrigger_reviewno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.3.0 latest |
B 87/100 | 5 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan agent-collab-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Agent Collab 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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