After Effects — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "after-effects-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "after-effects-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "after-effects-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 88,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (57 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"run-script\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"run-script\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"run_script\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "run-script"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/index.js"
},
"evidence": "pawn, spawnSync } from \"child_process\"; import * as fs from \"fs\"; import * as os from \"os\"; import * as path from \"path\"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/index.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (install-bridge.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`install-bridge.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "install-bridge.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import * as fs from \"fs\"; import * as path from \"path\"; import { fileURLToPath }",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "install-bridge.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (install-bridge.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`install-bridge.js:126`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "install-bridge.js"
},
"evidence": ").toString(\"base64\"); execSync(`powershell -NoProfile -EncodedCommand ${launcherEncoded}`, { stdio: \"inherit\" }); } i",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "install-bridge.js",
"line": 126,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"run-script\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"run-script\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "run-script"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/scripts/mcp-bridge-auto.jsx)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/scripts/mcp-bridge-auto.jsx:2856`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/scripts/mcp-bridge-auto.jsx"
},
"evidence": "return eval(\"(\" + text + \")\"); }; } if (typeof JSON.stringify !== \"function\") { (function () {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "build/scripts/mcp-bridge-auto.jsx",
"line": 2856,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "run-script",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"run_script\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get-results",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-help",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create-composition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create-adjustment-layer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "center-layers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-layer-clip-frames",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "setLayerKeyframe",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "setLayerExpression",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test-animation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply-effect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add-any-effect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply-effect-template",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-layer-effects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-available-effects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set-effect-property",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set-effect-keyframe",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-presets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search-presets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply-preset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mcp_aftereffects_get_effects_help",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run-bridge-test",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove-effect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add-marker",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set-audio-levels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-audio-info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze-audio-waveform",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "animate-to-audio",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "animate-from-data",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add-markers-bulk",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check-bridge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create-text-layer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "localize-comp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "populate-template",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "import-footage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list-project-items",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "relink-footage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create-camera",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "duplicate-layer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete-layer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set-layer-parent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reorder-layer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "precompose-layers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set-layer-mask",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch-set-layer-properties",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set-composition-properties",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect-comp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect-layer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "execute-script",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "see-frame",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "contact-sheet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "match-reference",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add-to-render-queue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "render-queue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "start-render",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "render-aerender",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"open_pr\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "render-status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "9771fa2fbf51e1c47f9e3f44017d9d80d3ce5d9af164f8696b3d56121cb065bb",
"stats": {
"tools": 57,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 1,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}