After Effects MCP Server
after-effects-mcp
npm
v1.13.0
Source verified
Published by a-y-ibrahim — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server that gives AI assistants deep programmatic control of Adobe After Effects: arbitrary ExtendScript execution, background rendering, deep project/layer inspection, and native Arabic/RTL and multilingual support.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 6 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Tool "run-script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run-script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_script" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run-script
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pawn, spawnSync } from "child_process"; import * as fs from "fs"; import * as os from "os"; import * as path from "path"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (install-bridge.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`install-bridge.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import * as fs from "fs"; import * as path from "path"; import { fileURLToPath }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server install-bridge.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (install-bridge.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`install-bridge.js:126`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ).toString("base64"); execSync(`powershell -NoProfile -EncodedCommand ${launcherEncoded}`, { stdio: "inherit" }); } i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server install-bridge.js
low Mutating tool "run-script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run-script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run-script
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/scripts/mcp-bridge-auto.jsx)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/scripts/mcp-bridge-auto.jsx:2856`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: return eval("(" + text + ")"); }; } if (typeof JSON.stringify !== "function") { (function () {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/scripts/mcp-bridge-auto.jsx
Tools 57
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
render-aerendernetwork egressrun-scriptruns code / shelladd-any-effectno sensitive capabilityadd-markerno sensitive capabilityadd-markers-bulkno sensitive capabilityadd-to-render-queueno sensitive capabilityanalyze-audio-waveformno sensitive capabilityanimate-from-datano sensitive capabilityanimate-to-audiono sensitive capabilityapply-effectno sensitive capability
Show 47 more tools ↓
apply-effect-templateno sensitive capabilityapply-presetno sensitive capabilitybatch-set-layer-propertiesno sensitive capabilitycenter-layersno sensitive capabilitycheck-bridgeno sensitive capabilitycontact-sheetno sensitive capabilitycreate-adjustment-layerno sensitive capabilitycreate-camerano sensitive capabilitycreate-compositionno sensitive capabilitycreate-text-layerno sensitive capabilitydelete-layerno sensitive capabilityduplicate-layerno sensitive capabilityexecute-scriptno sensitive capabilityget-audio-infono sensitive capabilityget-helpno sensitive capabilityget-layer-clip-framesno sensitive capabilityget-resultsno sensitive capabilityimport-footageno sensitive capabilityinspect-compno sensitive capabilityinspect-layerno sensitive capabilitylist-available-effectsno sensitive capabilitylist-layer-effectsno sensitive capabilitylist-presetsno sensitive capabilitylist-project-itemsno sensitive capabilitylocalize-compno sensitive capabilitymatch-referenceno sensitive capabilitymcp_aftereffects_get_effects_helpno sensitive capabilitypopulate-templateno sensitive capabilityprecompose-layersno sensitive capabilityrelink-footageno sensitive capabilityremove-effectno sensitive capabilityrender-queueno sensitive capabilityrender-statusno sensitive capabilityreorder-layerno sensitive capabilityrun-bridge-testno sensitive capabilitysearch-presetsno sensitive capabilitysee-frameno sensitive capabilityset-audio-levelsno sensitive capabilityset-composition-propertiesno sensitive capabilityset-effect-keyframeno sensitive capabilityset-effect-propertyno sensitive capabilityset-layer-maskno sensitive capabilityset-layer-parentno sensitive capabilitysetLayerExpressionno sensitive capabilitysetLayerKeyframeno sensitive capabilitystart-renderno sensitive capabilitytest-animationno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (57 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.13.0 latest |
B 88/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.11.1 |
B 88/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
v1.11.0 |
B 88/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v1.10.0 |
B 88/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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