Aethereum — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "aethereum",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "aethereum"
},
"server": {
"name": "aethereum"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/sdk-5FRGHEGL.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/sdk-5FRGHEGL.js:3042`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/sdk-5FRGHEGL.js"
},
"evidence": "ss(V, $); let N = Function(`${y0.default.self}`, `${y0.default.scope}`, V)(this, this.scope.get()); if (this",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/sdk-5FRGHEGL.js",
"line": 3042,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-3MMBQP4F.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-3MMBQP4F.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/chunk-3MMBQP4F.js"
},
"evidence": "FileSync, spawn } from \"child_process\"; function sanitizeSessionName(name) { return name.replace(/[.:$%]/g, \"_\"); } va",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/chunk-3MMBQP4F.js",
"line": 20,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-BFVTAROS.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-BFVTAROS.js:48`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/chunk-BFVTAROS.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFileSync } from \"child_process\"; import { join as join3, resolve, basename } from \"path\"; import { homedir as hom",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/chunk-BFVTAROS.js",
"line": 48,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-VJZJ4SQY.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-VJZJ4SQY.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/chunk-VJZJ4SQY.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFileSync } from \"child_process\"; import { realpathSync } from \"fs\"; import { dirname, join, relative, resolve } f",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/chunk-VJZJ4SQY.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-WFJLCKOP.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-WFJLCKOP.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/chunk-WFJLCKOP.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from \"child_process\"; import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from \"fs\"; import { homedir }",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/chunk-WFJLCKOP.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/index.js:195`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli/index.js"
},
"evidence": "n, execFileSync } from \"child_process\"; import { randomUUID } from \"crypto\"; import { createRequire } from \"module\"; imp",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli/index.js",
"line": 195,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/sdk-5FRGHEGL.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/sdk-5FRGHEGL.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/sdk-5FRGHEGL.js"
},
"evidence": "execFile as E6$ } from \"child_process\"; import { randomUUID as rz } from \"crypto\"; import { createReadStream as b6$, rea",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/sdk-5FRGHEGL.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/share-terminal-77YJXHBO.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/share-terminal-77YJXHBO.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/share-terminal-77YJXHBO.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFileSync } from \"child_process\"; import { appendFileSync, mkdirSync } from \"fs\"; import { join } from \"path\"; imp",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/share-terminal-77YJXHBO.js",
"line": 22,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([aethereum__fetch_code, aethereum__list_code]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_message, aethereum__send_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "aethereum__fetch_code → send_message"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [aethereum__fetch_code, aethereum__list_code] → sinks [send_message, aethereum__send_message]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"aethereum__fetch_code",
"aethereum__list_code"
],
"sinks": [
"send_message",
"aethereum__send_message"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"aethereum__fetch_code",
"aethereum__list_code"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"send_message",
"aethereum__send_message"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "catch_up",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_by_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_by_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_message",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__catch_up",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__search_by_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__search_by_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__send_message",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__set_mode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__join_room",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__leave_room",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__admin__set_mode_for",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__admin__kick",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__admin__mute",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__admin__unmute",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__share_intent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__declare_contract",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__set_contract_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__propose_contract",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__respond_to_proposal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__finalize_proposal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__record_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__set_brief",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__ask_human",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__record_verification",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__set_goal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__update_goal",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__set_directive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__clear_directive",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__claim",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__release",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__depend_on",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__set_ruleset",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__get_contract_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__create_ticket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__update_ticket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__claim_ticket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__share_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__get_team_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__await_team_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__blast_radius",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__linked_prs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__share_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__fetch_code",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__list_code",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__offer_handoff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__search_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum__room_view",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aethereum_reply",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "134d9a3dcced244c05f255f1f2a033113061cccf2298d16fea6823b884e91603",
"stats": {
"tools": 49,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 8,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}