Project Scope — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@adityasasidhar/project-scope-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@adityasasidhar/project-scope-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@adityasasidhar/project-scope-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 1.2,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-AUTH-2",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([validate_sql_query]) and tools that can send data out ([validate_shell_input]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "validate_sql_query → validate_shell_input"
},
"evidence": "sources [validate_sql_query] → sinks [validate_shell_input]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"validate_sql_query"
],
"sinks": [
"validate_shell_input"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"validate_shell_input\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"validate_shell_input\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"shell\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "validate_shell_input"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"validate_shell_input\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"validate_shell_input\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "validate_shell_input"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-AUTH-2",
"title": "Instruction-override directive",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Instruction-override directive detected in the description of tool \"detect_prompt_injection\". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.",
"remediation": "Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "detect_prompt_injection",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "Ignore previous",
"owasp": "LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection",
"data": {
"kind": "override"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"validate_sql_query"
],
"externalSink": [
"validate_shell_input"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"validate_sql_query",
"validate_shell_input"
],
"pathWired": true,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: validate_sql_query ⇒ validate_shell_input."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_repo_structure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_impact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_branch_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_commit_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_show_changes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_compare_branches",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_init",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "git_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "refactor_rename",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "refactor_extract_function",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "refactor_move_to_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "refactor_inline_variable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_dead_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_shell_input",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"shell\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "validate_sql_query",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"sql_query\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "validate_file_path",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "detect_template_injection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "detect_prompt_injection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_file_for_threats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scan_repo_for_threats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "d3941b4fb20b434a8b9c335463b8464f03733f50f07a213f4c0f82bc3d2518f8",
"stats": {
"tools": 20,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 0,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}