Project Scope MCP Server
@adityasasidhar/project-scope-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Published by @adityasasidhar — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for repository analysis, Git operations, and code refactoring tools
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Instruction-override directive MTC-INJ-AUTH-2 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([validate_sql_query]) and tools that can send data out ([validate_shell_input]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [validate_sql_query] → sinks [validate_shell_input]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow validate_sql_query → validate_shell_input
high Tool "validate_shell_input" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "validate_shell_input" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool validate_shell_input
low Mutating tool "validate_shell_input" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "validate_shell_input" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool validate_shell_input
low Instruction-override directiveMTC-INJ-AUTH-2
Instruction-override directive detected in the description of tool "detect_prompt_injection". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: Ignore previous
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool detect_prompt_injection · description
Tools 20
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
validate_shell_inputruns code / shellvalidate_sql_queryreads sensitive dataanalyze_impactno sensitive capabilitydetect_prompt_injectionno sensitive capabilitydetect_template_injectionno sensitive capabilityfind_dead_codeno sensitive capabilityget_repo_structureno sensitive capabilitygit_branch_statusno sensitive capabilitygit_commit_historyno sensitive capabilitygit_compare_branchesno sensitive capability
Show 10 more tools ↓
git_initno sensitive capabilitygit_show_changesno sensitive capabilitygit_statusno sensitive capabilityrefactor_extract_functionno sensitive capabilityrefactor_inline_variableno sensitive capabilityrefactor_move_to_fileno sensitive capabilityrefactor_renameno sensitive capabilityscan_file_for_threatsno sensitive capabilityscan_repo_for_threatsno sensitive capabilityvalidate_file_pathno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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