@aaronsb/kg-cli
npm
v0.14.0
Source verified
Published by aaronsb — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Knowledge Graph CLI and MCP server - interact with knowledge graph systems
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/mcp-allowlist.js:108`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: m', '**/id_rsa', '**/id_rsa.pub', '**/id_ed25519', '**/i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/mcp-allowlist.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/verb-router.js:114`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const { resolve } = require('path'); // Build full command: kg <path> <
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/verb-router.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/terminal-images.js:52`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: tallInstructions; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const fs = __importStar(require("fs")); const path =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/terminal-images.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
catalogingests untrusted inputontologyreads sensitive dataanalyze_polarity_axisno sensitive capabilityAPI Healthno sensitive capabilityartifactno sensitive capabilityconceptno sensitive capabilityDatabase Healthno sensitive capabilityDatabase Informationno sensitive capabilityDatabase Statisticsno sensitive capabilitydocumentno sensitive capabilityepistemic_statusno sensitive capabilityepochno sensitive capabilityexplore-graphno sensitive capabilitygraphno sensitive capabilityGraphProgram Language Referenceno sensitive capabilityingestno sensitive capabilityjobno sensitive capabilityMCP File Access Allowlistno sensitive capabilityprogramno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilitysession_contextno sensitive capabilitysession_ingestno sensitive capabilitysourceno sensitive capabilitySystem Statusno sensitive capabilityWorker Statusno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.14.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @aaronsb/kg-cli --online
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