Studio — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@1key4ai/mcp-studio",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@1key4ai/mcp-studio"
},
"server": {
"name": "@1key4ai/mcp-studio"
}
},
"grade": "C",
"score": {
"score": 74,
"threatScore": 85,
"grade": "C",
"band": "C",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 15.4,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-SECRECY-1",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source",
"file-write",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: 1k4_advisors → 1k4_list_files ⇒ 1k4_send_message. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "1k4_advisors → 1k4_list_files → 1k4_send_message"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"1k4_advisors",
"1k4_consult",
"1k4_brainstorm",
"1k4_get_file",
"lab_vm_ops",
"lab_web_fetch"
],
"sources": [
"1k4_list_files",
"lab_read_file",
"lab_list_files"
],
"sinks": [
"1k4_send_message",
"1k4_wait_for_message",
"lab_vm_ops"
],
"path": [
"1k4_advisors",
"1k4_list_files",
"1k4_send_message"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "1k4_advisors",
"to": "1k4_list_files",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "1k4_list_files",
"to": "1k4_send_message",
"kind": "schema-wired"
}
],
"wired": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:1045`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "e-account.*\\.json$/, /id_rsa/, /id_ed25519/, /\\.keystore$/, /\\.pyc$/, /\\.so$/, /\\.dylib$/, /\\.wasm$/, /\\",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 1045,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-SECRECY-1",
"title": "Secrecy directive (conceal action from the user)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Secrecy directive (conceal action from the user) detected in the description of tool \"lab_review_document\". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.",
"remediation": "Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_review_document",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "Do NOT tell the user",
"owasp": "LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection",
"data": {
"kind": "secrecy"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"lab_vm_ops\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"lab_vm_ops\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_vm_ops"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:1012`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; import { statSync, existsSync, readFileSync } from \"fs\"; import { join, relative",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 1012,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url\" on \"lab_web_fetch\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lab_web_fetch\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_web_fetch",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "url"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"lab_create_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"lab_create_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"create_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_create_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"lab_edit_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"lab_edit_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"edit_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_edit_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"lab_move_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"lab_move_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"move_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_move_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"lab_delete_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"lab_delete_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"lab_vm_ops\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lab_vm_ops\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_vm_ops",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2315`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "iles the modified files import (upstream) OR that import the modified files (downstream). Shown to reviewers as context-",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 2315,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"lab_create_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lab_create_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_create_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"lab_edit_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lab_edit_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_edit_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"lab_move_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lab_move_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_move_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"lab_delete_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lab_delete_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"lab_vm_ops\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lab_vm_ops\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_vm_ops"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"folder_path\" on \"1k4_list_files\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"1k4_list_files\" takes a path parameter \"folder_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "1k4_list_files",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.folder_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "folder_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"lab_edit_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lab_edit_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_edit_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"lab_read_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lab_read_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_read_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"folder_path\" on \"lab_list_files\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lab_list_files\" takes a path parameter \"folder_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_list_files",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.folder_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "folder_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file_name\" on \"lab_move_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lab_move_file\" takes a path parameter \"file_name\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_move_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file_name"
},
"data": {
"param": "file_name"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file_id\" on \"lab_delete_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lab_delete_file\" takes a path parameter \"file_id\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_delete_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file_id"
},
"data": {
"param": "file_id"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file_name\" on \"lab_delete_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lab_delete_file\" takes a path parameter \"file_name\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_delete_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file_name"
},
"data": {
"param": "file_name"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"folder_path\" on \"lab_delete_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"lab_delete_file\" takes a path parameter \"folder_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "lab_delete_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.folder_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "folder_path"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"1k4_advisors",
"1k4_consult",
"1k4_brainstorm",
"1k4_get_file",
"lab_vm_ops",
"lab_web_fetch"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"1k4_list_files",
"lab_read_file",
"lab_list_files"
],
"externalSink": [
"1k4_send_message",
"1k4_wait_for_message",
"lab_vm_ops"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"1k4_advisors",
"1k4_list_files",
"1k4_send_message"
],
"pathWired": true,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: 1k4_advisors → 1k4_list_files ⇒ 1k4_send_message."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "filename",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_review_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_advisors",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"web_search\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_quorum_reenable_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_quorum_skip_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_quorum_open_configurator",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_open_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_quorum_apply_edits",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_quorum_submit_configurator",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_consult",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_brainstorm",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_get_consult_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_get_brainstorm_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_get_review_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_cancel_consult",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_cancel_brainstorm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_dispatch_phase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_send_message",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_wait_for_message",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_get_session_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "1k4_list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
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