Studio (1key4ai) MCP Server

@1key4ai/mcp-studio npm v0.6.9

Published by @1key4ai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

1K4 Studio bridge for Claude Code. Send messages, manage files, and act as a Studio agent via MCP tools.

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Trust grade

74/100

Last scanned 2026-09-07 get badge →

Trust

C · 74/100

Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.

Capability

Critical

Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.

Coverage

Source

How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.

C Why this grade threat 85 − adoption risk = 74/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 15.4 = 85. What the published surface and source actually contain:

Points	What was found	Category
−15.4	Secrecy directive MTC-INJ-SECRECY-1	injection

2. Client adoption risk — 85 − 11 = 74. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

Points	Adoption-risk factor
−10	capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1	publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 25

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: 1k4_advisors → 1k4_list_files ⇒ 1k4_send_message. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow 1k4_advisors → 1k4_list_files → 1k4_send_message

high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-006

In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:1045`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: e-account.*\.json$/, /id_rsa/, /id_ed25519/, /\.keystore$/, /\.pyc$/, /\.so$/, /\.dylib$/, /\.wasm$/, /\

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/index.js

high Secrecy directive (conceal action from the user)MTC-INJ-SECRECY-1

Secrecy directive (conceal action from the user) detected in the description of tool "lab_review_document". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.

Evidence: Do NOT tell the user

Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.

Location: tool lab_review_document · description

high Tool "lab_vm_ops" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "lab_vm_ops" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool lab_vm_ops

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:1012`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { statSync, existsSync, readFileSync } from "fs"; import { join, relative

Location: server dist/index.js

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "lab_web_fetch"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "lab_web_fetch" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool lab_web_fetch · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Tool "lab_create_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "lab_create_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "create_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool lab_create_file

medium Tool "lab_edit_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "lab_edit_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "edit_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool lab_edit_file

medium Tool "lab_move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "lab_move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool lab_move_file

medium Tool "lab_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "lab_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool lab_delete_file

medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "lab_vm_ops"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "lab_vm_ops" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool lab_vm_ops · inputSchema.properties.command

medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-005

In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2315`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: iles the modified files import (upstream) OR that import the modified files (downstream). Shown to reviewers as context-

Location: server dist/index.js

low Mutating tool "lab_create_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "lab_create_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool lab_create_file

low Mutating tool "lab_edit_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "lab_edit_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool lab_edit_file

low Mutating tool "lab_move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "lab_move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool lab_move_file

low Mutating tool "lab_delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "lab_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool lab_delete_file

low Mutating tool "lab_vm_ops" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "lab_vm_ops" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool lab_vm_ops

low Unconstrained path parameter "folder_path" on "1k4_list_files"MTC-CAP-008

Tool "1k4_list_files" takes a path parameter "folder_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.