Zulip MCP Server

zulip-mcp-server npm v2.2.0

Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

Stateful, ergonomic MCP server for Zulip and Discord with ambient awareness, persistent monitoring, and natural date-based queries

Trust grade
A
95/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 95/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 95/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−2 publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([start_monitoring, get_unread_messages, discord_start_monitoring, discord_get_unread_messages, Zulip - Unread Messages Summary, Discord - Unread Messages Summary]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_message, discord_send_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [start_monitoring, get_unread_messages, discord_start_monitoring, discord_get_unread_messages, Zulip - Unread Messages Summary, Discord - Unread Messa

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow start_monitoring → send_message

Tools 26

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • Discord - Unread Messages Summaryingests untrusted input
  • discord_get_unread_messagesingests untrusted input
  • discord_send_messagenetwork egress
  • discord_start_monitoringingests untrusted input
  • get_unread_messagesingests untrusted input
  • send_messagenetwork egress
  • start_monitoringingests untrusted input
  • Zulip - Unread Messages Summaryingests untrusted input
  • add_reactionno sensitive capability
  • delete_messageno sensitive capability
Show 16 more tools ↓
  • Discord - Monitoring Statusno sensitive capability
  • discord_delete_messageno sensitive capability
  • discord_find_userno sensitive capability
  • discord_get_channel_historyno sensitive capability
  • discord_get_monitored_channelsno sensitive capability
  • discord_list_channelsno sensitive capability
  • discord_stop_monitoringno sensitive capability
  • find_userno sensitive capability
  • get_channel_historyno sensitive capability
  • get_monitored_channelsno sensitive capability
  • get_stream_topicsno sensitive capability
  • get_user_profileno sensitive capability
  • list_streamsno sensitive capability
  • list_usersno sensitive capability
  • stop_monitoringno sensitive capability
  • Zulip - Monitoring Statusno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v2.2.0 latest A 95/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-09

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Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 95/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan zulip-mcp-server --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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