Zsnoop MCP Server
zsnoop-mcp
PyPI
v0.4.1
Published by hamsolodev — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 15.4 = 85. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code MTC-SRC-004 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 85 − 11 = 74. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (src/zsnoop_mcp/transport.py)MTC-SRC-004
In the server's implementation (`src/zsnoop_mcp/transport.py:84`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: base64.b64decode('{encoded}').decode(), '<zfs-snoop-agent>', 'exec
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/zsnoop_mcp/transport.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/zsnoop_mcp/transport.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/zsnoop_mcp/transport.py:84`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec(compile(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/zsnoop_mcp/transport.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (agent/zfs_snoop_agent.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`agent/zfs_snoop_agent.py:301`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server agent/zfs_snoop_agent.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/zsnoop_mcp/transport.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/zsnoop_mcp/transport.py:84`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/zsnoop_mcp/transport.py
Tools 30
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
checksum_filereads sensitive datafetch_diringests untrusted inputfetch_fileingests untrusted inputread_filereads sensitive dataagent_infono sensitive capabilitybisect_changeno sensitive capabilitycontent_grepno sensitive capabilitydataset_propertiesno sensitive capabilitydiff_snapshotsno sensitive capabilityfile_diffno sensitive capabilityfile_historyno sensitive capabilityfind_deletedno sensitive capabilityfind_filesno sensitive capabilityfirst_appearanceno sensitive capabilitylast_appearanceno sensitive capabilitylist_datasetsno sensitive capabilitylist_dirno sensitive capabilitylist_hostsno sensitive capabilitylist_poolsno sensitive capabilitylist_snapshotsno sensitive capabilitypool_statusno sensitive capabilityrestore_dirno sensitive capabilityrestore_fileno sensitive capabilitysize_breakdownno sensitive capabilitysize_deltano sensitive capabilitysnapshot_cadenceno sensitive capabilitysnapshots_containingno sensitive capabilitystale_snapshotsno sensitive capabilitytop_consumersno sensitive capabilityversions_ofno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.1 latest |
C 74/100 | 4 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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