Zscaler MCP Server
zscaler-mcp
PyPI
v0.15.4
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Official Zscaler Integrations MCP Server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (integrations/azure/azure_mcp_operations.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`integrations/azure/azure_mcp_operations.py:1644`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Path.home() / ".ssh" / "id_rsa.pub" if ssh_key_path.is_file(): use_existing_key = _prompt_yes_no(f"Use exist
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server integrations/azure/azure_mcp_operations.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (integrations/aws/bedrock-agentcore/aws_mcp_operations.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`integrations/aws/bedrock-agentcore/aws_mcp_operations.py:1121`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ] try: subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, capture_output=True, text=True) except FileNotFoundError as
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server integrations/aws/bedrock-agentcore/aws_mcp_operations.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (integrations/aws/bedrock-agentcore/strands_agent_chat.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`integrations/aws/bedrock-agentcore/strands_agent_chat.py:1032`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: clear": os.system("cls" if os.name == "nt" else "clear") continue if cmd ==
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server integrations/aws/bedrock-agentcore/strands_agent_chat.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (integrations/aws/eks/eks_mcp_operations.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`integrations/aws/eks/eks_mcp_operations.py:427`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15, check=False) except (subproc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server integrations/aws/eks/eks_mcp_operations.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (integrations/azure/azure_mcp_operations.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`integrations/azure/azure_mcp_operations.py:209`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: if capture: r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True) if check and r.returncode != 0:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server integrations/azure/azure_mcp_operations.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (integrations/azure/foundry_agent.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`integrations/azure/foundry_agent.py:928`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: clear": os.system("cls" if os.name == "nt" else "clear") continue if cmd ==
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server integrations/azure/foundry_agent.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (integrations/google/adk/adk_agent_operations.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`integrations/google/adk/adk_agent_operations.py:192`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: if capture: r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True) if check and r.returncode != 0:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server integrations/google/adk/adk_agent_operations.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (integrations/google/gcp/gcp_mcp_operations.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`integrations/google/gcp/gcp_mcp_operations.py:213`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: if capture: r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True) if check and r.returncode != 0:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server integrations/google/gcp/gcp_mcp_operations.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (integrations/helm-chart/helm_mcp_operations.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`integrations/helm-chart/helm_mcp_operations.py:218`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: if capture: r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True) if check and r.returncode != 0:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server integrations/helm-chart/helm_mcp_operations.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/build_mcpb.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/build_mcpb.py:63`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: etedProcess: return subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, **kwargs) def regenerate_and_verify_manifest() -> dict: ""
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/build_mcpb.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/setup-mcp-server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/setup-mcp-server.py:141`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: etedProcess: return subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, text=True, **kwargs) def http_get( url: str, *,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/setup-mcp-server.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 7
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.15.4 latest |
A 92/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.15.3 |
A 92/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
v0.15.2 |
A 92/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v0.15.0 |
A 92/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
v0.14.0 |
A 92/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
Show 2 more versions ↓
v0.13.4 |
A 92/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v0.13.3 |
C 77/100 | 12 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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