Zoogent — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "zoogent",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "zoogent"
},
"server": {
"name": "zoogent"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 91,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 1.2,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (41 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; const command = process.argv[2]; const args = process.argv.slice(3); const DATA_",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/process-manager.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/process-manager.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/process-manager.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { mkdirSync } from 'node:fs'; import { eq, and, sql } from 'drizzle-orm';",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/core/process-manager.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/db/seed-skills.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/db/seed-skills.js:576`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/db/seed-skills.js"
},
"evidence": "OGENT_SHARED_DIR\\`). No child_process spawning, no native addons. ## Limits - SQLite, single-writer (WAL helps; high-wr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/db/seed-skills.js",
"line": 576,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/routes/api-llms.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/routes/api-llms.js:685`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/routes/api-llms.js"
},
"evidence": "for ~95% of agents. - exec (escape hatch): Source lives OUTSIDE zoogent. You provide command + args + cwd. Zoogent j",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/routes/api-llms.js",
"line": 685,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"zoogent\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "zoogent"
},
"evidence": "node -e \"console.log('\\n ZooGent installed. To get started:\\n\\n mkdir my-agents && cd my-agents\\n zoogent init\\n zoogent start\\n claude mcp add zoo",
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"zoogent\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "zoogent"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_started",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_teams",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_team",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "select_team",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_agent_guide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "enable_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "disable_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trigger_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_logs",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"get_logs\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "write_agent_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_agent_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_skills",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_skill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_skill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_skill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "assign_skill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unassign_skill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_costs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_budget_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_team_knowledge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "approve_knowledge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "archive_knowledge",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_integrations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_integration",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_integration",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_team_library",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "write_team_library_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_team_library_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_team_library_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "854598a0a1d917328d5c7aa55e81d61f23904bc4f89651262496e1395ddcb5b7",
"stats": {
"tools": 41,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 1
}
}
}